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Abstract
In this paper, I construct a putty-clay model of directed technical change and use
it to analyze the effect of environmental policy on energy use in the United States.
The model matches key data patterns that cannot be explained by the standard Cobb-
Douglas approach used in climate change economics. In particular, the model captures
both the short- and long-run elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy
inputs, as well as trends in final-use energy efficiency. My primary analysis examines
the impact of new energy taxes. The putty-clay model suggests that tax-inclusive
energy prices need to be 273% higher than laissez-faire levels in 2055 in order to achieve
policy goals consistent with international agreements. By contrast, the Cobb-Douglas
approach suggests that prices need only be 136% higher. To meet the same goals, the
putty-clay model implies that final good consumption must fall by 6.5% relative to a
world without intervention, which is more than three times the prediction from the
standard model. In a second analysis, I find that policy interventions cannot achieve
long-run reductions in energy use without increasing prices, implying that energy
efficiency mandates and R&D subsidies have limited potential as tools for climate
change mitigation. Finally, I use the model to analyze the long-run sustainability of
economic growth in a world with non-renewable resources. Using two definitions of
sustainability, the new putty-clay model delivers results that are more optimistic than
the existing literature.
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1 Introduction
To address global climate change, it is crucial to understand how carbon emissions will respond to
policy interventions. Changes in energy efficiency will be an important component of this response.
Indeed, rising energy efficiency – rather than the use of less carbon intensive energy sources – has
been the major force behind the decline in the carbon intensity of output in the United States over
the last 40 years (Nordhaus, 2013). Thus, energy efficiency will almost certainly be a critical factor
in any future approach to mitigating climate change.
Integrated assessment models (IAMs) are the standard tool in climate change economics. They
combine models of the economy and climate to calculate optimal carbon taxes. The leading models
in this literature frequently treat energy as an input in a Cobb-Douglas aggregate production func-
tion (e.g., Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Golosov et al., 2014).1 Despite the significant insights gained
from the IAMs, there are two restrictive assumptions in this approach to modeling energy. First,
in response to changes in energy prices, the Cobb-Douglas approach allows immediate substitution
between capital and energy, which is at odds with short-run features of the U.S. data (Pindyck and
Rotemberg, 1983; Hassler et al., 2012, 2016b). This suggests that the standard approach may not
fully capture the effect of new taxes that raise the effective price of energy. Second, technological
change is exogenous and undirected in the standard model. A substantial literature, however, sug-
gests that improvements in energy-specific technology will play a pivotal role in combating climate
change and that environmentally-friendly research investments respond to economic incentives (e.g.,
Popp et al., 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2012).
In this paper, I construct a putty-clay model of directed technical change that matches several
key features of the data on U.S. energy use. In particular, the model captures both the short-
and long-run elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy inputs, as well as trends in
final-use energy efficiency. In the model, each piece of capital requires a fixed amount of energy to
operate at full potential. Technical change, however, can lower this input requirement in the next
iteration of the capital good, or it can increase the ability of the next iteration to produce final
output.2,3 When the price of energy increases relative to other inputs, firms invest more in energy
1Research on the human impact of climate change is large and spans many disciplines (Weyant, 2017). I focus on
the economics literature building on the neoclassical growth model, where both energy use and output are determined
in general equilibrium. Many prominent IAMs take output to be exogenous or abstract from modeling energy use
(e.g., Hope, 2011; Anthoff and Tol, 2014). Another strand of the climate change literature uses large computable
general equilibrium (CGE) models. Of particular relevance to the current paper are analyses using the EPPA (Morris
et al., 2012) or Imaclim (Crassous et al., 2006) models, each of which has elements of putty-clay production.
2Capital good producers turn raw capital, ‘putty,’ into a capital good with certain technological characteristics,
including energy efficiency. While energy efficiency can be improved by research and development, there is no
substitution between energy and non-energy inputs once the capital good is in operation, capturing the rigid ‘clay’
properties of installed capital.
3The literature on putty-clay production functions has a long history (e.g., Johansen, 1959; Solow, 1962; Cass and
Stiglitz, 1969; Calvo, 1976). Of particular relevance is work by Atkeson and Kehoe (1999) who investigate the role of
putty-clay production in explaining the patterns of substitution between energy and non-energy inputs in production.
The older literature on putty-clay models focuses on choosing a type of capital from an existing distribution or on the
simultaneous use of old and new vintages. The current paper focuses on how the cutting-edge of technology, which is
embodied in capital goods, evolves over time. As discussed in the next section, this modeling approach draws insight
from Hassler et al. (2012, 2016b), who provide econometric evidence that a putty-clay model of directed technical
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efficiency and less in other forms of technology. In the long-run, the endogenous research activity
leads to a constant expenditure share of energy, even though there is no short-run substitution
between energy and non-energy inputs.
The model also matches the source of gains in energy efficiency. In particular, I show that the
declines in the carbon and energy intensities of output in the U.S. have been driven by reductions
in final-use energy intensity. In other words, energy efficiency improves when capital goods and
consumer durables require less energy to run, not when the energy sector becomes more efficient at
turning primary energy (e.g., coal) into final-use energy (e.g., electricity). Moreover, these energy
efficiency improvements have been more important than substitution between energy sources in
explaining the historical trend towards cleaner production. The putty-clay model examines this
crucial margin of technological progress, which has not received much attention in the existing
literature on the environment and directed technical change (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2012, 2016). To
capture changes in final-use energy efficiency, I construct a new directed technical change model in
which innovation occurs in different characteristics of capital goods. This new model yields different
research incentives than the seminal approach of Acemoglu (1998, 2002), where innovation occurs
in different sectors.
The new putty-clay model allows for a simple and transparent calibration procedure. It re-
sembles the neoclassical growth model in several important ways, implying that many parameters
are standard and can be taken from the existing literature. I calibrate the innovation and energy
sectors to aggregate U.S. data on economic growth and fossil fuel energy use. I then use the model
to perform three exercises. In my primary exercise, I examine the effect of energy taxes on energy
use and compare the results to the standard Cobb-Douglas approach. I also analyze whether it is
possible for policies, such as R&D subsidies or efficiency mandates, to reduce long-run energy use
without raising the price of energy. Finally, I asses how the presence of non-renewable resources
effects the potential for economic growth to be sustained in the very long run.
Both the Cobb-Douglas and putty-clay models are consistent with long-run features of the U.S.
data. As a result, they have identical predictions for long-run energy use in the absence of climate
policy. Their predictions for the impact of climate policy, however, differ significantly. In the long
run, both models predict that energy expenditure share of output will be constant. When new taxes
raise the effective price of energy, however, the Cobb-Douglas model assumes that capital and labor
can be quickly substituted for energy, leaving the expenditure share unchanged. In contrast, the
putty-clay model predicts that the expenditure share will slowly evolve as the result of purposeful
research activity. As a result, the energy expenditure share will be higher on the transition path
and may converge to a permanently higher long-run level. Compared to the standard approach,
therefore, the putty-clay model predicts that higher energy taxes are needed to achieve a desired
reduction in energy use. This analysis shows that constraining the model match short-run features
of the data can greatly alter the predicted long-run reactions to environmental policy.
change could fit patterns of substitution in U.S. energy use and investigate the implication of these forces for long-run
economic growth in a social planner’s model with finite energy resources and an aggregate production function.
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These differences are quantitatively important. The new model suggests that tax-inclusive
energy prices need to be 273% higher than laissez-faire levels in 2055 in order to achieve policy
goals consistent with the Paris Agreement.4 By contrast, the standard Cobb-Douglas approach
suggests that tax-inclusive energy prices need only be 136% higher. To meet the same goals,
the putty-clay model implies that final good consumption must fall by 6.5% relative to a world
without intervention, which is more than three times the prediction from the standard model.
Thus, compared to the standard approach, the new model predicts that greater taxation and more
forgone consumption are necessary to achieve environmental policy goals. When applying the same
taxes to both models, the new putty-clay model of directed technical change predicts 24% greater
cumulative energy use over the next century. This indicates that policy designed with the Cobb-
Douglas model will yield significantly different environmental results in a world better represented
by the new putty-clay model.
Research subsidies and efficiency mandates are commonly used in attempts mitigate climate
change and achieve energy security (Gillingham et al., 2009; Allcott and Greenstone, 2012). Despite
their popularity, these policies may be ineffective due to rebound effects. Rebound occurs when
economic behavior lessens the reduction in energy use following efficiency improvements. A long
existing literature attempts to indirectly evaluate the effectiveness of such policies by estimating the
size of rebound effects, usually in partial equilibrium or static settings.5 The new putty-clay model,
however, makes it possible to directly analyze the broader motivating question: can policies that
improve energy efficiency achieve long-term reductions in energy use, even if they do not increase
energy prices? I start by considering the standard rebound exercise of a one-off improvement
in energy efficiency. Such shocks lead to short-run reductions in energy use, but also lower the
incentive for future investment in energy efficient technology. As a result, the interventions lead to
temporary increases in medium-term energy use relative to world without policy, an extreme form
of rebound known as ‘backfire.’ Eventually, the short-term reductions and medium-term backfire
offset each other, leaving cumulative energy use unchanged. Permanent policy interventions can
overcome rebound effects to achieve long-run reductions in energy use relative to laissez-faire, but
cannot achieve absolute decreases in energy use. Thus, the model suggests that policies that do
not raise the price of energy will be unable to meet long-run environmental policy goals.
I also examine the sustainability of economic growth in a world with non-renewable resources.
Using two different versions of sustainability, I find results that are more optimistic than the existing
literature. The first – and more standard – definition ignores climate change and is concerned with
the ability of an economy to maintain current levels of consumption growth. Focusing on models
4In particular, I simulate taxes needed to reduce energy use to 60% of 2005 levels by the year 2055. This is
consistent with goals laid out in the Paris Agreement, which suggests that the United States adopt policies consistent
with a 80% reduction in carbon emissions by 2050. Thus, I examine a case where half of the required reduction in
carbon emissions comes from reductions in energy use. The goals are outlined in the Intended Nationally Determined
Contribution (INDC) submitted by the United States to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCC), which is available at: http://www4.unfccc.int/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/
United%20States%20of%20America/1/U.S.%20Cover%20Note%20INDC%20and%20Accompanying%20Information.pdf.
5See Gillingham (2014) and Gillingham et al. (2016) for reviews of the literature.
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with exhaustible resources, the existing DTC literature suggests that this form of sustainability is
impossible because energy use is currently increasing, which is not possible in the long run (e.g.,
Andre´ and Smulders, 2014; Hassler et al., 2012, 2016b). I consider the case where resources are
inexhaustible, but only accessible at increasing and unbounded extraction costs,6 a formulation
that captures the abundance of coal and the potential to exploit ‘unconventional’ sources of oil
and natural gas (Rogner, 1997; Rogner et al., 2012). In this setting, I find that energy use will
necessarily increase in the long run (in the absence of policy intervention), implying that the
presence of non-renewable resources alone does not pose a threat to this form of sustainability.
The second definition of sustainability asks whether environmental policy can keep the stock of
pollution low enough to prevent an ‘environmental disaster.’ The existing literature suggests that
this form of sustainability is impossible when polluting and non-polluting factors of production are
complements (Acemoglu et al., 2012). By considering the ability of new technologies to save on
dirty inputs, I show that it is possible for policy to prevent an environmental disaster, even in the
case of perfect complementarity.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 surveys the related literature. Section
3 discusses the empirical motivation underlying the theory. The model is presented in Section 4
and the calibration in Section 5. Section 6 reports the results of the quantitative analyses, and
Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
As described above, this paper contributes to the literature on climate change economics that takes
a Cobb-Douglas approach to energy modeling in IAMs. This paper is also closely related to a
growing literature demonstrating that directed technical change (DTC) has important implications
for environmental policy. These studies generally focus on clean versus dirty sources of energy,
rather than energy efficiency. Acemoglu et al. (2012) demonstrate the role that DTC can play
in preventing environmental disasters and emphasize the elasticity of substitution between clean
and dirty production methods. The model in this paper bears more resemblance to an ‘alternate’
approach they mention where firms can invest in quality improvements or carbon abatement, where
the latter only occurs in the presence of carbon taxes. Several other studies also investigate the
case where policy interventions affect how technological change is directed between production and
abatement activities.7 Lemoine (2017) demonstrates how the transition between sources of energy
is affected by both innovation and increasing extraction costs in a world where new innovations
are complementary to energy sources, but different energy sources are close substitutes. Aghion
et al. (2016) provide a static DTC model of clean and dirty innovation in the automotive industry
that includes an intra-product decision about energy efficiency. I build on these earlier works by
6Models with increasing extraction costs have a long history in economics (e.g., Heal, 1976; Solow and Wan, 1976;
Pindyck, 1978).
7See, for example, Hart (2008), Peretto (2008), Grimaud and Rouge (2008), and Gans (2012). Hart (2004) and
Ricci (2007) consider the decision to investment in abatement technology in a model where technology is embodied
in different vintages of capital.
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constructing a new model of directed technical change, focusing on energy efficiency, quantitatively
investigating the macroeconomic effects of prominent environmental policies, and comparing the
results to the standard approach taken in IAMs.8 I also provide evidence that ‘environmental
disasters’ can be averted even when polluting and non-polluting inputs are perfect complements, a
result that is more optimistic than those in the existing DTC literature (Acemoglu et al., 2012).
Two recent papers extend the standard DTC model to quantitative investigation of macroeco-
nomic policy (Acemoglu et al., 2016; Fried, forthcoming). Both focus on the issue of clean versus
dirty energy sources and account for energy efficiency by calibrating growth in clean energy to
overall de-carbonization of the economy. The current paper builds on these works by explicitly
investigating energy efficiency as a separate source of innovation, using a new underlying model of
DTC, and comparing the results to the standard approach taken in climate change economics.9
This paper is also related to the literature on DTC and energy use, which focuses on the efficiency
of the energy transformation sector, rather than the energy requirements of capital goods. The
literature begins with Smulders and De Nooij (2003) who apply the original DTC model directly
to energy efficiency and use it to analyze the effects of exogenous changes in energy availability.
Subsequent literature has focused on the relationship between DTC and the sustainability of long-
run economic growth in the presence of exhaustible resources (e.g., Di Maria and Valente, 2008;
Andre´ and Smulders, 2014; Hassler et al., 2012, 2016b). I build on the existing literature by
constructing a new DTC model that focuses on final-use energy efficiency and by quantitatively
examining the impacts of climate change mitigation policies. I also show how the prospects for
long-run sustainability improve when considering the more empirically relevant case of inexhaustible
resources and increasing extraction costs.10
The new putty-clay model of directed technical change builds on the aggregate social planner’s
model of innovation and exhaustible resources developed by Hassler et al. (2012, 2016b). In order
to investigate the role of energy efficiency in climate change mitigation policy, the current model
differs from their work in two key aspects. First, I construct a decentralized model with incentives
for innovation, which is necessary to quantify the effects of policy and to account for externalities.
Rather than importing the seminal directed technical change model developed by Acemoglu (1998,
8A related and influential literature looks at induced, but not directed, technical change and its implications for
climate policy. These models tend to focus on social planner problems. Key contributions in this literature include
Goulder and Schneider (1999), Goulder and Mathai (2000), Sue Wing (2003), and Popp (2004).
9It is also important to note that the DTC literature is supported by microeconomic studies that investigate
the presence of directed technical change. Newell et al. (1999) and Jaffe et al. (2003) demonstrate that the energy
efficiency of energy intensive consumer durables (air conditioners and gas water heaters) responds to changes in
prices and government regulations, providing evidence for the existence of directed technical change. Similarly, Popp
(2002) finds that energy efficiency innovation, as measured by patents, responds to changes in energy prices. He
looks at both innovations in the energy sector and in the energy efficiency characteristics of other capital goods.
More recently, Dechezlepreˆtre et al. (2011) and Calel and Dechezlepretre (2016) find that patents for ‘low carbon’
technologies, which include more energy efficient and less carbon intensive innovations, respond to both energy prices
and public policies designed specifically to address climate change. Aghion et al. (2016) find that government policies
have a strong effect on energy efficient research in the automotive sector.
10Peretto and Valente (2015) focus on another form of sustainability, the growth of population in a world with a
fixed amount of land. Their model includes two types of innovation, horizontal and vertical, but not innovation that
is directed towards different factors of production.
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2002), I take a new approach in which innovation occurs in different characteristics of capital goods,
not in different sectors. As discussed in Section 3, the new approach is motivated by data on U.S.
energy use. Second, I consider the case of infinite potential supplies of energy and increasing
extraction costs. The potentially infinite supply of energy incorporates the role of coal in fossil fuel
energy use11 and the possibility for new methods of resource extraction to become feasible as costs
rise (Rogner, 1997; Rogner et al., 2012). Moreover, the model of DTC and increasing extraction
costs predicts that, in the absence of policy, energy use will increase in the long run. This is
consistent with data and a first-order concern for climate policy, but contrary to the predictions
of models with only exhaustible resources. More generally, the goal of climate change policy is to
avoid using all available fossil fuels, implying that the optimal management of exhaustible resources
in not a primary concern in this context (Covert et al., 2016).
This study is also related to the literature on the rebound effect, which can be thought of in
two parts: a microeconomic literature that estimates rebound effects for specific goods12 and a
macroeconomic literature that investigates static general equilibrium effects.13 By studying this
question in the context of a growth model, I incorporate several factors that are generally excluded
from the literature. Most importantly, the putty-clay model incorporates the effects of changes in
energy efficiency on subsequent innovation, a neglected issue that Gillingham et al. (2015) describe
as a ‘wild card’ in our understanding of the long-run effects of energy efficiency policies. Moreover,
the existing macroeconomic rebound literature focuses heavily on the elasticity of substitution
between energy and non-energy inputs in production (e.g., Sorrell et al., 2007; Borenstein et al.,
2015; Lemoine, 2016). The putty-clay model of directed technical change allows the elasticity to
vary over time, matching key features of U.S. data on energy use. The model also accounts for
the cost of achieving energy efficiency,14 as well as long-run changes in energy extraction costs
and capital accumulation, none of which has received much attention in the existing quantitative
literature.
3 Empirical Motivation
In this section, I discuss patterns in the data that motivate the theoretical choices made in this
paper. In particular, I present evidence that a) declines in the final-use energy intensity of output
drive reductions in the carbon intensity of output, b) there is a very low short-run elasticity of
substitution between energy and non-energy inputs, and c) there is no long-run trend in the energy
expenditure share of final output.
11Coal is predicted to to be the primary driver of global carbon emissions and is available in abundant supply
(van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012; Golosov et al., 2014; Hassler et al., 2016a).
12See, for example, Allcott (2011) and Jessoe and Rapson (2014), amongst others.
13See Lemoine (2016) for a recent theoretical treatment of rebound. For quantitative results from CGE models,
see Turner (2009) and Barker et al. (2009), amongst others.
14Fowlie et al. (2015) discuss the costs of achieving energy efficiency in a microeconomic setting.
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To analyze the determinants of the carbon intensity of output, I consider the following decom-
position:
CO2
Y
=
CO2
Ep
· Ep
Ef
· Ef
Y
, (1)
where CO2 is yearly carbon emissions, Y is gross domestic product, Ep is primary energy use
(e.g., coal, oil), and Ef is final-use energy consumption (e.g., electricity, gasoline). The carbon
intensity of primary energy, CO2Ep , captures substitution between clean and dirty sources of energy
(e.g., coal versus solar). The efficiency of the energy sector, which transforms primary energy into
final-use energy, is captured by
Ep
Ef
. For example, the ratio decreases when power plants become
more efficient at transforming coal into electricity. The final-use energy intensity of output,
Ef
Y ,
measures the quantity of final-use energy used in production and consumption. For example, the
ratio decreases when manufacturing firms use less electricity to produce the same quantity of goods.
The results of this decomposition are presented in Figure 1, which plots the carbon intensity
of output and each component from equation (1) for the United States from 1971-2014. Data are
normalized to 1971 values.15 The carbon intensity of output fell over 60% during this time period,
and this decline is matched almost exactly by the decline in the final-use energy intensity of output.
The carbon intensity of primary energy, CO2Ep , declined approximately 15% over this period. While
this is a significant improvement for environmental outcomes, it is relatively small compared to
the overall improvements in the carbon intensity of output. Finally, the efficiency of the energy
transformation sector, as measured by the inverse of
Ep
Ef
, actually declined roughly 15% over this
period.16
Motivated by this evidence, I construct a model that focuses on the final-use energy intensity of
output. This creates a significant break with existing work. Existing macroeconomic research on
directed technical change and climate change focuses on clean versus dirty sources of energy and
does not consider energy efficiency as a distinct source of innovation (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2012,
2016; Fried, forthcoming). Transition to cleaner energy sources will undoubtedly be an important
component of any approach to mitigate climate change, but the historical data strongly suggest
that improved energy efficiency will be a pivotal aspect of any policy response. At the same time,
applying the seminal DTC model of Acemoglu (1998, 2002) to the question of energy efficiency
would require focusing on the efficiency of the energy sector (e.g., Smulders and De Nooij, 2003;
Andre´ and Smulders, 2014).17 Thus, I construct a new model where energy efficiency is driven by the
energy requirements of capital goods. This theoretical innovation significantly alters the underlying
15Appendix Section A describes the data and provides links to the original sources.
16This result is driven by differences in the efficiency of transformation across different sources of primary energy,
rather than technological regress.
17Existing work on induced technical change in social planner models also focuses on the efficiency of the energy
sector, rather than final-use energy intensity (e.g., Popp, 2004; Bosetti et al., 2006).
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Figure 1: This figure decomposes the decline in the carbon intensity of output. CO2 is yearly carbon emissions,
Y is GDP, Ep is primary energy, and Ef is final-use energy. This figure demonstrates that the fall in the carbon
intensity of output, CO2
Y
, has been driven by decreases in final-use energy intensity of output,
Ef
Y
, rather than the use
of cleaner energy sources, CO2
Ep
, or a more efficient energy transformation sector,
Ep
Ef
. Data are from the International
Energy Agency (IEA) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). All values are normalized to 1971 levels.
incentives for research and development, implying that it is important to consider energy efficiency
as a distinct source of innovation.18
Figure 2 provides evidence on the elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy
inputs. In particular, it shows the expenditure share of energy (Eshare), the primary energy intensity
of output (
Ep
Y ), and the average real energy price use in the United States from 1971-2014.
19 The
data indicate that expenditure, but not energy intensity, reacts to short-term price fluctuations,
suggesting that there is very little short-run substitution between energy and non-energy inputs.
At the same time, there is no trend in the energy expenditure share of output, despite increasing
prices. This pattern suggests that there is a constant long-run expenditure share in the absence
of fundamental changes in parameters or policy, and equivalently, that the long-run elasticity of
substitution between energy and non-energy inputs is close to one. The model in this paper will
match both the short- and long-run patterns facts. Hassler et al. (2012, 2016b) provide a formal
maximum likelihood estimate of the short-run elasticity of substitution between energy and non-
energy inputs. They find an elasticity of substitution very close to zero. For the purposes of this
paper, I will treat the elasticity as exactly zero and use a Leontief production structure, which allows
18Of course, not all improvements in energy efficiency need to driven by technical change. In particular, sectoral
reallocation could explain aggregate changes in energy use. Decomposition exercises suggest that improvements in
intra-sectoral efficiency, rather than reallocation, have been the key driver of falling energy intensity over this period
(Sue Wing, 2008; Metcalf, 2008). They also suggest that, prior to 1970, sectoral reallocation was the primary driver
of falling energy intensity. The calibration will focus on the post-1970 period. Existing work suggests that there was
a significant regime shift in both energy prices and energy efficiency improvements after this period (e.g., Hassler
et al., 2012, 2016b; Baumeister and Kilian, 2016; Fried, forthcoming).
19This figure focuses on primary, rather than final-use, energy due to limitations on expenditure data.
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Figure 2: This figure demonstrates that short-run movements in energy prices affect the energy expenditure share
of output (Eshare) in the short-run, but not the energy intensity of output (
EP
Y
). At the same time, there is no
long-run trend in the energy expenditure share of output, despite increasing prices. Data are taken from the Energy
Information Administration (EIA) and the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). All values are normalized to 1971
levels.
for the construction of a tractable putty-clay model with innovation in capital good characteristics.
They also find that energy efficiency increases after prices rise, suggesting a DTC model of the type
investigated here.20
The trendless expenditure share of energy in Figure 2 serves as the motivation for the Cobb-
Douglas production function in IAMs (Golosov et al., 2014; Barrage, 2014). At the same time,
the analysis by Hassler et al. (2012, 2016b) suggests that the long-run energy expenditure share
– which will eventually be constant – must be significantly higher than the current level. The
model developed in this paper bridges the gap between these two approaches. It yields a constant
energy expenditure share that matches the current level, while simultaneously replicating both
short- and long-run patterns of substitution. Moreover, the analysis shows how constructing a
model that matches both short- and long-run features of data significantly alters the predicted
long-run reactions to climate policy. In particular, the putty-clay model suggests that higher taxes
20As demonstrated in Figure 2, the price of energy in the United States had an upward trend from 1971-2014.
Once again, this is a good match for post-1970 data, but not for U.S. data in the preceding two decades, where
energy prices actually declined. Consistent with the predictions of the model, decomposition exercises suggest that
intra-sectoral energy efficiency declined during this period of falling prices (Sue Wing, 2008). In this paper, I focus on
the case where prices increase in the long run, though this is not central to any of the policy analysis. Increasing prices
are consistent with theoretical work based on the Hotelling problem or increasing extraction costs (e.g., Hotelling,
1931; Heal, 1976; Pindyck, 1978), as well as empirical work suggesting a U-shaped pattern in long-run energy prices
(e.g., Slade, 1982; Pindyck, 1999; Hamilton, 2012). The U.S. Energy Information Administration predicts the energy
prices will increase across a wide range of sources and end-uses over the next several decades. See ‘Table 3. Energy
Prices by Sector and Source’ at https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/aeo/. Given the general difficulty in predicting
future energy prices, especially in the short to medium run, I focus on relative outcomes, where the comparison
occurs between models or relative to a ‘business as usual’ case (Baumeister and Kilian, 2016).
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and more forgone consumption are necessary to meet environmental policy goals when compared
to the Cobb-Douglas model, which is only consistent with long-run patterns in the data.
4 Model
4.1 Structure
4.1.1 Final Good Production
Final good production is perfectly competitive. The model extends the standard endogenous growth
production function to account for energy use. To match the extremely low short-run elasticity of
substitution between energy and non-energy inputs, I will consider a Leontief structure
Qt =
∫ 1
0
min[
(
AN,t(i)Xt(i)
)α
L1−αt , AE,t(i)Et(i)] di, (2)
s.t. AE,t(i)Et(i) ≤ AN,t(i)Xt(i)αL1−αt ∀i, (3)
where Qt is gross output at time t, AN,t(i) is the the quality of capital good i, Xt(i) is the quantity
of capital good i, Lt is the aggregate (and inelastic) labor supply, AE,t(i) is the energy efficiency
of capital good i, and Et(i) is the amount of energy devoted to operating capital good i. Several
components of the production function warrant further discussion. As in the standard endogenous
growth production function, output is generated by a Cobb-Douglas combination of aggregate
labor, Lt, and a series of production process, each of which uses a different capital good, indexed
by i. Unlike the endogenous growth literature, each production process also requires energy to run.
Thus, the usual capital-labor composite measures the potential output that can be created using
each production process, and the actual level of output depends on the amount of energy devoted
to each process, Et(i). The notion of potential output is captured by constraint (3). Each capital
good i has two distinct technological characteristics. The quality of the capital good, AN,t(i),
improves its ability to produce output, and the energy efficiency of the capital good, AE,t(i), lowers
the amount of energy needed to operate the production process at full potential.21,22
4.1.2 Energy Sector
Energy is available in infinite supply, but is subject to increasing extraction costs (see, e.g., Heal,
1976; Pindyck, 1978; Lin and Wagner, 2007). Extraction costs are paid in final goods, and energy
is provided by a perfectly competitive sector with open access. The increasing extraction cost
21Consistent with the econometric literature on energy use, energy requirements depend both on the amount of
capital and the amount of labor being used in the production process (Van der Werf, 2008; Hassler et al., 2012,
2016b). Second, consistent with both the econometric and DTC literatures, improvements in non-energy technology,
AN (i), raise energy requirements (e.g., Smulders and De Nooij, 2003; Van der Werf, 2008; Hassler et al., 2012, 2016b;
Fried, forthcoming).
22Appendix Section B.6.2 presents as equivalent formulation for final good production that highlights the continuity
with the existing DTC literature.
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incorporates two main forces that govern long-run energy availability. First, it captures the increase
in cost needed to extract conventional energy resources from harder-to-access areas.23 Second,
it captures the increase in cost that may occur when a particular energy source is exhausted,
necessitating a switch to a type of energy which is more difficult to extract. In particular, the
infinite supply of energy and increasing extraction costs capture the existence of ‘unconventional’
energy sources, which have high extraction costs, but are available in vast quantities (Rogner, 1997;
Rogner et al., 2012).24 As in Golosov et al. (2014), the treatment of energy sources as infinite in
potential supply also incorporates the abundance of coal, which is predicted to be the major driver
of climate change (van der Ploeg and Withagen, 2012; Hassler et al., 2016a).25
The marginal cost of extraction, which will also be equal to the price, is given by
pE,t = ξE¯
ι
t−1, (4)
where E¯t−1 is total energy ever extracted at the start of the period. The law of motion for the
stock of extracted energy is given by
E¯t = Et−1 + E¯t−1. (5)
Intuitively, energy producers exploit new sources of energy in each period and the difficulty of
extraction is constant within each source.26,27
23For example, recent research suggests that most new oil production comes from the exploitation of new geographic
areas, rather than improved technology applied to existing sources of energy (Hamilton, 2012).
24For example, Rogner et al. (2012) estimate a resource base of 4,900 – 13,700 exajoules (EJ) for conventional oil,
compared with annual production of 416 EJ across all energy sources. Thus, constraints on availability of conventional
oil sources may be binding. The ability to exhaust fossil fuel energy sources, however, appears much less likely when
considering other options. The resource base for unconventional sources of oil is estimated to be an additional 3,750
– 20,400 EJ. Meanwhile, the resource base for coal and natural gas (conventional and unconventional) are 17,300–
435,000 EJ and 25,100 – 130,800 EJ, respectively. These estimates rely on projections regarding which resources
will be profitable to extract from the environment. When considering the full range of energy sources that could
become profitable to extract as resource prices tend towards infinity, the numbers grow even larger. In particular,
such ‘additional occurrences’ are estimated to be larger than 1 million EJ for natural gas and 2.6 million EJ for
uranium.
25Technically, Golosov et al. (2014) specify a finite amount of coal, but assume it is not fully depleted. Thus, it
has no scarcity rent, although it does have an extraction cost. Oil, by contrast, is assumed to have no extraction
cost, but does have a positive scarcity rent. Hart and Spiro (2011) survey the empirical literature and find little
evidence that scarcity rents are a significant component of energy costs. They suggest that policy exercises focusing
on scarcity rents will give misleading results.
26This is consistent, for example, with recent evidence from the oil industry, where drilling, but not within-well
production, responds to changes in prices (Anderson et al., 2014).
27A primary goal of this paper is to compare the results of the putty-clay model to the standard Cobb-Douglas
approach used in IAMs. Since IAMs examine worldwide outcomes, it is crucial to consider the equilibrium effect
of policy on energy prices. Hence, the comparison between models is most accurate when considering endogenous
prices. At the same time, I also use the model to investigate the effect of policies pursued in the United States. In
this case, endogenous energy prices can be motivated in two ways. First, it is possible to think of the United States
as a closed economy, which is a good match for some, but not all, sources of primary energy. Alternatively, one can
imagine the policies being applied on a worldwide level with the United States making up a constant fraction of total
energy. To ensure that the key qualitative results of the paper are not driven by this assumption, I also consider
the opposite extreme of exogenous energy prices, which implicitly treats the United States as a small open economy
taking unilateral policy actions. In this case, energy prices will increase at a constant exogenous rate.
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4.1.3 Final Output
Final output is given by gross production less total energy extraction costs, which are equal to
energy expenditures by the final good producer. As long as equation (3) holds with equality,28 final
output is given by
Yt = L
1−α
t
∫ 1
0
[
1− pE,t
AE,t(i)
](
AN,t(i)Xt(i)
)α
di. (6)
This formulation further illuminates the continuity between the production function used here and
the standard approach in endogenous growth models. Output has the classic Cobb-Douglas form
with aggregate labor interacting with a continuum of capital goods. As in the endogenous growth
literature, this structure maintains tractability in the putty-clay model, despite the Leontief nature
of production.
Final output can either be consumed or saved for next period. In the empirical application,
each period will be ten years. Following existing literature, I assume complete depreciation during
production (Golosov et al., 2014). Thus, market clearing in final goods implies
Yt = Ct +Kt+1 = Ltwt + rtKt + Πt + p
R
t + Tt, (7)
where Kt is aggregate capital, Πt is total profits, Tt is the net government budget, and p
R
t is
total payments to R&D inputs (discussed in the next section). When examining the effects of
environmental policy, I assume that the government balances the budget using lump-sum taxes or
transfers.
4.1.4 Capital Goods and Research
Each type of capital good is produced by a single profit-maximizing monopolist in each period.
This monopolist also undertakes in-house R&D activities to improve the embodied technological
characteristics, AN,t(i) and AE,t(i). The R&D production function is given by
AJ,t(i) =
[
1 + ηJRJ,t(i)R
−λ
J,t
]
AJ,t−1, J ∈ {N,E}, (8)
where RJ,t(i) is R&D inputs assigned to characteristic J by firm i in period t, RJ,t ≡
∫ 1
0 RJ,t(i)di,
and AJ,t−1 ≡ max{AJ,t−1(i)}. In words, R&D builds on aggregate knowledge, AJ,t−1, and current
period within-firm research allocations, RJ,t(i), but is also subject to a congestion externality R
−λ
J,t
caused by duplicated research effort. When the period ends, patents expire and the best technology
becomes available to all firms. Monopolists make decisions to maximize single period profits.29
28To ensure that equation (3) holds with equality, it is sufficient, but not necessary, to assume that capital fully
depreciates after each period. If capital fully depreciates, then in equilibrium forward looking consumers will never
‘over-invest’ in capital and drive its return to zero. This assumption will be maintained in the empirical analysis,
which uses a time period of ten years, and is also employed in Golosov et al. (2014).
29This can be motivated in several ways. Most directly, the identity of the firm producing capital good i could
change after each period. Alternatively, it could be the case that firms are infinitely lived but myopic, which seems
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There are a unit mass of R&D inputs, yielding30
RN,t +RE,t = 1 ∀t. (9)
I assume that the investment price is fixed at unity. Thus, market clearing implies that∫ 1
0
Xt(i)di = Kt, (10)
where Kt is aggregate capital.
4.1.5 Consumer Problem
The consumer side of the problem is standard. In particular, the representative household chooses
a path of consumption such that
{Ct}∞t=0 = argmax
∞∑
t=0
βtLt
c˜1−σt
1− σ , (11)
where c˜t = Ct/Lt. Population growth is given exogenously by
Lt+1 = (1 + n)Lt. (12)
I am interested in the decentralized equilibrium. Thus, I consider the case where the representative
household takes prices and technology as given. In other words, the household’s budget constraint
is given by the second equality in (7).
4.2 Analysis
As demonstrated in Appendix Section B.1, the first order conditions for the final good producer
yield the following inverse demand functions:
pX,t(i) = αAN,t(i)
α
[
1− τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
]
L1−αt Xt(i)
α−1, (13)
wt = (1− α)
[
1− τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
]
L−αt
(
AN,t(i)Xt(i)
)α
, (14)
reasonable considering the ten year period length. The set-up presented here is isomorphic to one where firms are
infinitely lived and the aggregate technology, AJ,t−1, is given by the average of the previous period‘s technology as
in Fried (forthcoming). This would open up the possibility of technological regress, though it would not occur in
equilibrium.
30This is consistent with both existing literature on DTC and the environment (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Fried,
forthcoming) and the social planner model provided by (Hassler et al., 2012, 2016b). Often, models of directed
technical change refer to the fixed set of research inputs as scientists (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2012; Fried, forthcoming).
This would be applicable here, though generating the standard Euler equation would require the representative
household to ignore scientist welfare (in the environmental literature, directed technical change and capital are
generally not included simultaneously). This would be a close approximation to a more inclusive utility function as
long as scientists made up a small portion of the overall population. For simplicity, I refer to research inputs, which
could be scientists, research labs, etc.
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where τt ≥ 1 is a proportional tax on energy. The intuition for the result is straightforward. The
final good producer demands capital goods until marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost. Unlike
the usual endogenous growth model, marginal revenue is equal to marginal product minus the cost
of energy needed to operate capital goods. Consider the case where the final good producer is
already operating at a point where
(
AN,t(i)Xt(i)
)α
L1−αt = AE,t(i)Et(i). If the final good producer
purchases more capital, it receives no increase in output unless there is a corresponding increase in
energy purchased. The final good producer realizes this when making optimal decisions and adjusts
demand for capital accordingly. This iso-elastic form for inverse demand maintains the tractability
of the model.
Monopolist providers of capital goods must decide on optimal production levels and optimal
research allocations. See Appendix Section B.2 for a formal derivation of the monopolists’ behavior.
Given the iso-elastic inverse demand function, monopolists set price equal to a constant markup
over unit costs. Since capital goods must be rented from consumers, the unit cost is given by the
rental rate, rt. Thus, monopolist optimization yields
pX,t(i) =
1
α
rt, (15)
Xt(i) = α
2
1−α r
−1
1−α
t AN,t(i)
α
1−αLt
[
1− τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
] 1
1−α , (16)
p¯iX,t(i) = (
1
α
− 1)α 21−α r
−α
1−α
t AN,t(i)
α
1−αLt
[
1− τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
] 1
1−α , (17)
where p¯iX,t(i) is production profits (i.e., profits excluding research costs) of the monopolist.
To understand research dynamics, it is helpful to look at the relative prices for research inputs,
(1− ηSt )pRE,t(i)
pRN,t(i)
=
τtpE,tAN,t(i)
αAE,t(i)2
[
1− τtpE,tAE,t(i)
] ηER−λE,tAE,t−1
ηNR
−λ
N,tAN,t−1
, (18)
where pRJ,t(i) is the rent paid to research inputs used by firm i to improve technological characteristic
J at time t and ηSt ∈ [0, 1) is a subsidy for energy efficient research. There are several forces affecting
the returns to R&D investment. First, increases in the tax-inclusive price of energy increase the
relative return to investing in energy efficiency. Second, the return to investing in a particular type
of R&D is increasing in its efficiency. Research efficiency, in turn, depends on inherent productivity,
ηJ , accumulated knowledge, AJ,t−1, and the amount of congestion, R−λJ,t . Third, since energy and
non-energy inputs are complements in production, increases in AN,t(i) raise the return to investing
in AE,t(i) and vice versa. These effects, however, are asymmetric. To maximize profits, monopolists
balance two forces that drive demand for their products: ‘output-increasing’ technological progress,
AN,t(i), and ‘cost-saving’ technological progress, AE,t(i). The asymmetry occurs because energy
efficiency, AE,t(i), has a negative and convex effect on the cost of energy per unit of final output,
τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
. Conversely, proportional increases in AN,t(i) lead to proportional increases in output.
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Finally, the return to investing in the quality of capital goods is increasing in the share of final
output paid to capital good producers, α.
In the usual DTC model, this analysis would demonstrate the role of market size and price
effects in research incentives. As demonstrated in equation (18), however, aggregate inputs do not
affect R&D decisions in this model. In other words, market size effects play no role in this model.
This is due to the short-run complementarity between energy and non-energy inputs. Moreover,
the price effects in this model differ from those in the usual DTC model. Since the price of the final
good is the numeraire,
τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
is the cost of energy per unit of final good production, and 1− τtpE,tAE,t(i)
is the cost of non-energy inputs in final good production. Thus, the relative input prices do affect
research allocations, but the relative price is completely determined by the cost of energy extraction.
Moreover, as explained above, the relative price of energy – along with lagged technology levels
– enter asymmetrically, unlike in the seminal model. These theoretical differences highlight the
importance of considering the case where improvements in energy efficiency are driven by final-use
energy, rather than using the more common approach where innovation occurs in different sectors.
Given that all firms use common technology at the start of the period, they make identical
R&D decisions and, as a result, they end the period with identical technology. Moreover, there is a
unit mass of monopolists. Thus, RJ,t(i) = RJ,t ∀i, J, t. The optimal research allocations are given
by the implicit solution to (19) and (20),
RE,t =
√
τtpE,t
AE,t−1
√
1
α(1−ηSt )
[ ηER−λE,t
ηN (1−RE,t)−λ + ηER
−λ
E,t − ηER1−λE,t
]
+ (1 + ηER
1−λ
E )− 1
ηER
−λ
E,t
, (19)
RN,t = 1−RE,t. (20)
This formulation highlights the simple closed form solution in the special case where λ = 0 and
ηSt = 0. To analyze the determinants of research activity, it is instructive to consider multiplying
both sides of (19) by ηER
−λ
E,t so that the growth rate of energy efficiency technology is given as
a function of the other parameters. Since ηSt ∈ [0, 1), the left-hand side is strictly increasing
in RE,t in this formulation and the right-hand side is strictly decreasing in RE,t. Thus, we can
note a few important partial effects. First, the level of non-energy technology does not affect the
research allocation. The perfect complementarity in final good productions drives this result. As
expected, increases in the tax-inclusive price of energy lead to increases in the fraction of research
inputs devoted to advancing energy efficient technology. More surprisingly, increases in past energy
efficiency lead to decreases in the amount of research effort devoted to energy efficiency, even
though the research productivity builds on past knowledge. As in the case of non-energy research,
this improvement in research productivity is exactly balanced by the complementary nature of
production. In the case of energy efficiency, however, the convex relationship between energy
efficiency and the effective cost of energy,
τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
, creates further disincentive to invest in energy
research when energy efficiency is already high. As expected, the growth rate of energy efficiency
is increasing in the size of the research subsidy, ηSt , and decreasing in the capital share, α.
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Utility maximization yields
( c˜t
c˜t+1
)−σ
= βrt+1. (21)
Noting that all monopolists make the same decisions and that there is a unit mass of monopolists,
the real interest rate is given by
rt = α
2AαN,t
[
1− τtpE,t
AE,t
]
L1−αt K
α−1
t , (22)
where the market clearing condition from equation (10) has been applied.
4.3 Equilibrium
Definition 1. A competitive equilibrium is a sequence of prices, {wt, pX,t, rt, pRt , pE,t}∞t=0, alloca-
tions, {Ct,Kt, Lt, Et, RN,t, RE,t}∞t=0, technology levels, {AN,t, AE,t}∞t=0, and environmental policies,
{τt, ηSt }∞t=0, such that each of the following conditions holds ∀t:
• The economy obeys market clearing conditions for final goods, (7), and capital goods, (10).
• Optimal research allocations solve (19) and (20).
• The dynamics for technology follow (18), noting that all monopolists make identical decisions.
• Consumer behavior follows the Euler equation, (21).
• Factor prices are given by (4), (14), (15), and (22), noting that all monopolists make identical
decisions and that the market for capital goods clears.
• The economy obeys laws of motion for total extracted energy, (5), and population, (12).
• Initial Conditions AJ,−1 for J ∈ {E,N}, K0, L0, and E¯−1 are given.
4.4 Balanced Growth under Laissez-Faire
In this section, I examine long-run outcomes in the absence of environmental policy. To focus on
empirically relevant cases, I maintain the following assumption for the remainder of the paper:
ηE > n, (A.1)
which rules out extreme cases where all research activity is devoted to improving energy efficiency
even in the absence of environmental policy. Section 5 shows that this assumption is satisfied by
an order of magnitude in the data.
Definition 2. A laissez-faire equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium without environmental pol-
icy. Formally, τt = 1 and η
S
t = 0 ∀t.
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Definition 3. A balanced growth path (BGP) occurs when final output, technology, and consump-
tion grow at constant rates.
On a balanced growth path (BGP), research allocations must remain fixed. Consider the laissez-
faire case where there is no energy policy. From equations (19) and (20), it is immediate that
pE,t
AE,t−1
is constant. Intuitively, this occurs because of the non-linear relationship between energy efficiency,
AE,t, and the cost of energy per unit of output,
pE,t
AE,t
. When energy prices increase, monopolists have
greater incentive to invest in energy efficient technology, but this incentive dissipates as technology
improves. As a result, both energy prices and energy efficient technology grow at the same constant
rate, g∗E , on the BGP.
31 Thus, the increasing price of energy is exactly offset by improvements in
energy efficiency.
Definition 4. The energy share of expenditure, denoted by θE, is the sum of resources paid to
energy producers and energy taxes as a fraction of final output. Formally, θE,t ≡ τtpE,tEtYt .
Given that energy prices and energy efficient technology grow at the same rate on the BGP,
it is straightforward to show that the energy share of expenditure is constant in a laissez-faire
equilibrium. In particular,
θE,t =
pE,t/AE,t
1− pE,t/AE,t , (23)
which must be constant given that
pE,t
AE,t−1 is fixed and the growth rate of energy efficient technology
is constant.32 Thus, despite the Leontief nature of production, the model still delivers a constant
long-run energy expenditure share. As demonstrated in Section 3, this is consistent with aggregate
data on U.S. energy use. Importantly, the expenditure share is only constant on the BGP. The
low short-run elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy inputs implies that the
expenditure share would increase one-for-one with an unexpected increase in the energy price,
until research allocations had a chance to react to the change in prices. This creates a significant
difference with the Cobb-Douglas model, where the energy expenditure share is constant even on
the transition path following a price shock. The Cobb-Douglas model is discussed further in Section
4.6.
The fact that energy efficient technology and the price of energy grow at the same rate yields
the first of two key BGP relationships. In particular, noting the relationship between energy use
and the price of energy, as given by (4) and (5), yields
(1 + g∗M )
ι = (1 + g∗E), (BGP-RD)
31For the price of energy to grow at a constant rate, energy use must also grow at a constant rate, which will occur
on the BGP.
32See Hart (2013) for a general discussion of the relationship between factor shares and directed technical change.
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where g∗M is the growth rate cumulative energy use. On the BGP, this must also be the growth
rate of per period energy use. This equation summarizes the conditions for a BGP on the research
side of the economy.
I now move to considering the remainder of the economy. Consider the growth rate of TFP in
this model.
Definition 5. Total factor productivity is defined as in the standard neoclassical growth model.
Formally, TFP ≡ Yt
Kαt L
1−α
t
.
It is immediate that
TFPt = A
α
N,t
[
1− pE,t
AE,t
]
. (24)
Since
pE,t
AE,t
is constant on the BGP in the absence of policy, TFP grows at rate, (1 + g∗N )
α − 1,
which is also constant. Since the consumer problem is standard, the model now reduces to the
neoclassical growth model with monopolistic competition, implying that the putty-clay model with
directed technical change will have the usual BGP properties. In particular, both final and gross
output will grow at rate g∗Y = (1+g
∗
N )
α
1−α (1+n)−1. Given equation (2), the growth rate of energy
use (both cumulative and per period) is given by
1 + g∗M =
(1 + g∗N )
α
1−α
1 + g∗E
(1 + n). (BGP-QE)
Together, equations (BGP-RD) and (BGP-QE) determine the relative growth rates of technology
on the unique BGP. Adding in market clearing for R&D inputs, (9), yields the optimal research
allocations and applying the law of motion for technology, (8), gives the technology and energy use
growth rates. The technology growth rates are then sufficient to characterize the output-side of the
BGP, which behaves as in the standard model.
Remark. In a laissez-faire equilibrium, energy use is strictly increasing on the BGP, i.e., g∗M > 0.
Proof. The remark follows from equation (BGP-RD) and the proof to Proposition 2, which demon-
strates that research allocations are interior on the BGP.
Contrary to a world with only exhaustible energy sources, the current model predicts that energy
use will be increasing in the long-run in the absence of environmental policy. Intuitively, this result
holds because there is only incentive for energy efficient research when cumulative energy use (and,
therefore, the price of energy) is increasing. But, in the absence of energy efficient research, energy
use is necessarily increasing. Thus, there is no equilibrium with decreasing energy use. This has
immediate implications for climate policy, which depends on limiting the use of fossil energy, and
for the long-run sustainability of economic growth.
Definition 6. An environmental disaster occurs when E¯t > Eˆ.
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The concept of environmental disasters has gained attention in the recent literature on climate
change and DTC (Acemoglu et al., 2012; Lemoine, 2017). Since the focus of this paper is fossil
fuel energy sources, it is convenient to view an environmental disaster as being determined by total
energy use.
Proposition 1. The BGP in a laissez-faire equilibrium always leads to an environmental disaster.
Proof. The proof follows from the definition of an environmental disaster and the preceding remark.
Section 6.1 discusses the concept of an environmental disaster in greater detail. Proposition 2
summarizes and extends the results from this section. In particular, it uses the relationship between
equations (BGP-RD) and (BGP-QE) to explicitly characterize the balanced growth path.
Proposition 2. In a laissez-faire equilibrium, there exists a unique BGP on which each of the
following holds true:
1. The research allocations are implicitly given by
R∗E =
{[
(1+ηN (1−R∗E)1−λ)
α
1−α (1+n)
] 1
1+1/ι−1
ηE
} 1
1−λ
.
2. Technological growth rates are given by g∗E = ηE(R
∗
E)
1−λ and g∗N = ηN (1 − R∗E)1−λ. The
relationship between growth rates can be expressed as:
(1 + g∗E)
ι+1
ι = (1 + g∗N )
α
1−α (1 + n).
3. Output per worker and consumption per worker grow at a constant rate, g∗R = (1+g
∗
N )
α
1−α −1.
4. Total output and the capital stock grow at a constant rate, g∗Y = (1 + g
∗
R)(1 + n) − 1, which
implies that the capital-output ratio is fixed.
5. The real interest rate, rt, is constant.
6. Energy use grows at rate g∗M =
1+g∗R
1+g∗E
(1 + n)− 1 > 0.
7. The expenditure shares of energy, capital, labor, R&D inputs, and profits are all constant. In
particular, the expenditure share of energy is implicitly given by
θ∗E
1+θ∗E
=
1+ηE(R
∗
E)
1−λ
1
α
[
ηE(R
∗
E
)−λ
ηN (1−R∗E)−λ
+ηE(R
∗
E)
−λ−ηE(R∗E)1−λ
]
+1+ηE(R
∗
E)
1−λ
.
Proof. The intuition is provided in the text, and a formal proof is provided in Appendix Section
B.4.
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4.5 Balanced Growth with Environmental Policy
In this section, I consider long-run economic outcomes in the presence of environmental policy.
Definition 7. An equilibrium with environmental policy is a competitive equilibrium where τt =
τ0(1 + gτ )
t, gτ , τ0 > 0 and η
S
t = η
S ≥ 0 ∀t.33
In a world with increasing energy taxes, equations (19) and (20) now imply that the growth
rate of energy efficiency is equal to the product of growth in the energy price and the growth of
the taxes. Thus, balanced growth on the research side of the economy requires
(1 + g∗M )
ι(1 + gτ ) = (1 + g
∗
E), (BGP-RD
′)
which is equivalent to the laissez-faire condition if gτ = 0. This also implies that, on a BGP,
limt→∞
pE,t
AE,t
= 0. Thus, limt→∞[Qt − Yt] = 0 and limt→∞ θE,t = τtpE,tAE,t , which is constant. In the
limit, the model again reduces to that of the standard neoclassical growth model with monopolistic
competition. As a result, the BGP condition for the output side of the economy is unchanged:
1 + g∗M =
(1 + g∗N )
α
1−α
1 + g∗E
(1 + n). (BGP-QE′)
The economy will not reach a BGP in finite time. Using the same steps as in Section 4.4, it is
now possible to characterize the BGP. Noting the similarity between (BGP-RD′) and (BGP-QE′)
on one hand and (BGP-RD) and (BGP-QE) on the other, it is immediate that the growth rate of
technological progress is unaffected by the level of taxes or the research subsidy.
Remark. In an equilibrium with environmental policy, changes in energy research subsidies and
the level of energy taxes have no effect on the BGP growth rate of energy. Formally,
dg∗M
dτ0
=
dg∗M
dηS
= 0.
Proof. The intuition follows from the preceding discussion.Formally, the remark follows from Propo-
sition 4.
Noting that changes in the level of subsidies do not affect the long-run allocation of research
inputs, examination of (19) indicates that research subsidies do affect the energy expenditure share
and, therefore, the level of energy use. This creates another significant difference with the Cobb-
Douglas model, where the energy expenditure share is virtually fixed in response to environmental
policy.34 This result is summarized in the following remark.
Remark. In an equilibrium with environmental policy, increases in the research subsidy decrease
the energy expenditure share on the BGP. Formally,
dθ∗E
dηS
> 0.
33In this definition, the laissez-faire equilibrium is a special case of an equilibrium with environmental policy. I
restrict the formal analysis to the case of exponentially increasing taxes and a fixed research subsidy for analytic
convenience. In particular, this restriction allows for the simple characterization of a balanced growth path, but does
not drive any of the underlying intuition.
34Tax-inclusive energy expenditure is a constant share of gross output, but the rebate of taxes implies that the
share in total output decreases slightly in response to an increase in taxes.
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Proof. The remark follows from Proposition 4. The intuition is given in the preceding discussion.
As demonstrated in equation (BGP-RD′), the existence of increasing energy taxes weakens the
link between the cost of energy extraction, pE,t, and energy efficient research. In particular, there
can be incentives for energy efficient research even when the price of energy is decreasing, as long
as the tax on energy is increasing quickly enough. Thus, it is possible to have an equilibrium with
a constant energy price.
Remark. In an equilibrium with environmental policy, energy use is weakly increasing on the
BGP. Formally, g∗M ≥ 0. Moreover, dg
∗
M
dgτ
< 0.
Proof. The remark follows from the proof to Proposition 4.
Proposition 3. The BGP in an equilibrium with environmental policy does not always leads to
an environmental disaster.
Proof. The proof follows from the definition of an environmental disaster and the preceding remark.
All of the results presented thus far are summarized and extended in Proposition 4. In particular,
it uses the relationship between equations (BGP-RD′) and (BGP-QE′) to explicitly characterize
the BGP in the presence of environmental policy.
Proposition 4. In an equilibrium with environmental policy, there exists a unique BGP on which
each of the following holds true:
1. The research allocations are implicitly given by
R∗E =
{[
(1+ηN (1−R∗E)1−λ)
α
1−α (1+n)(1+gτ )1/ι
] 1
1+1/ι−1
ηE
} 1
1−λ
.
2. Technological growth rates are given by g∗E = ηE(R
∗
E)
1−λ and g∗N = ηN (1 − R∗E)1−λ. The
relationship between growth rates can be expressed as
(1 + g∗E)
ι+1
ι = (1 + g∗N )
α
1−α (1 + n)(1 + gτ ).
3. Output per worker and consumption per worker grow at a constant rate, g∗R = (1+g
∗
N )
α
1−α −1.
4. Total output and the capital stock grow at a constant rate, g∗Y = (1 + g
∗
R)(1 + n) − 1, which
implies that the capital-output ratio is fixed.
5. The real interest rate, rt, is constant.
6. Energy use grows at rate g∗M =
1+g∗R
1+g∗E
(1 + n)− 1 ≥ 0.
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7. The expenditure shares of energy, capital, labor, R&D inputs, and profits are all constant. In
particular, the expenditure share of energy is implicitly given by
θ∗E =
1+ηE(R
∗
E)
1−λ
1
α(1−ηS)
[
ηE(R
∗
E
)−λ
ηN (1−R∗E)−λ
+ηE(R
∗
E)
−λ−ηE(R∗E)1−λ
]
+1+ηE(R
∗
E)
1−λ
.
Proof. The intuition is provided in the text, and a formal proof is provided in Appendix Section
B.4.
4.6 Comparison to Cobb-Douglas
As mentioned in the introduction, the standard approach in climate change economics is to treat
energy as a Cobb-Douglas component of the aggregate production function (Nordhaus and Boyer,
2000; Golosov et al., 2014). The standard Cobb-Douglas production function is given by
QCDt = A
CD
t K
γ
t E
ν
t L
1−α−ν
t ,
where ACDt grows at an exogenous rate, gCD. Since energy extraction costs pE,t units of the final
good, final output is given by
Y CDt = (1−
ν
τ
)ACDt K
γ
t E
ν
t L
1−α−ν
t .
As a result, the energy expenditure share under Cobb-Douglas is given by
θCDE,t =
ν
1− ντt
.
In the absence of policy, the energy expenditure share is constant, matching the long-run elasticity
of substitution between energy and non-energy inputs, but not the near-zero short-run elasticity
of substitution. This has important implications for climate policy. In the Cobb-Douglas model, a
tax on energy use – no matter how large – generates declines in energy use that are sufficient to
leave the expenditure share essentially unchanged.35
Since addressing climate change inherently involves long-run outcomes, it has been posited
that the Cobb-Douglas approach may provide accurate predictions about the reaction of energy
use to policy interventions over the relevant time frame, even though it cannot match short-run
responses (Golosov et al., 2014). The analytical results from Section 4.5, however, cast doubt on
this assertion. The putty-clay model of directed technical change matches both the short- and long-
run elasticities, suggesting that it will more accurately predict the effect of environmental taxes on
energy use. This new model suggests that, in response to policy, energy use will not fall by enough
to leave the expenditure share unchanged. In particular, the energy expenditure share will not be
constant on the transition path, and the balanced growth level of the energy expenditure share
may increase permanently in response to policy. Thus, there is good reason to expect that the
35In response to new energy taxes, there is actually a slight decrease in the energy expenditure share, which is due
purely to the tax rebate. This effect is quantitatively unimportant.
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Cobb-Douglas approach overestimates the decline in energy use following an environmental policy
intervention. Section 6.2 quantifies the difference in predictions between the models.36
5 Calibration
5.1 External Parameters
I solve the model in 10 year periods. As discussed above, the consumer and non-energy production
portions of the model are standard. Thus, I take several parameters from the existing literature.
In particular, I follow Golosov et al. (2014) and set α = .35, δ = 1, σ = 1, and β = .860.37 I
assume that the economy starts without environmental policy. Thus, all taxes and subsidies can
be thought of as relative to ‘business as usual’ case, which serves as the baseline.
In addition to standard neoclassical elements, the putty-clay model includes R&D and energy
extraction. Thus, the parameters from these segments of the model cannot be taken from the
existing literature. I calibrate them to aggregate U.S. data. Data sources and details can be found
in Appendix A. Due to limitations on energy expenditure data, I restrict attention to the period
1971-2014. For energy use, I use the consumption of primary energy across all sources.38
Following the structure of the model, I calculate gross output, Qt, as final output, Yt, plus energy
expenditure. I measure AE,t = Qt/Et, yielding g
∗
E = 0.21 on the BGP (2.0% annual growth). On
the BGP, the growth rate of income per capita is given by g∗R = (1 + g
∗
N )
1
1−α − 1. In the data,
g∗R = 0.19 (1.8% annual growth), which yields g
∗
N = 0.39. The average energy expenditure share in
the data is 8.5%, which I take to be the balanced growth level. In the data, n = 0.10.
Below, I calibrate the R&D sector of the model to match key BGP moments. The BGP
is uninformative about research congestion, λ, which measures the trade-off between advances in
overall productivity and energy efficiency. As a base value, I take λ = 0.21 from Fried (forthcoming),
who also captures the congestion of moving research inputs from energy-related research to general
purpose research, making it a natural starting point for quantitative exercises presented here. I
will also consider cases where λ ∈ {0, 0.105, 0.31} for robustness.
36In Appendix Section B.5, I explain the calibration procedure for Cobb-Douglas and describe the balanced growth
path. I calibrate both models so that they have identical predictions for output and energy use in the absence of
environmental taxes. Due to other differences between the models, especially the difference in market structure
– monopolistic competition in the putty-clay model with directed technical change and perfect competition in the
Cobb-Douglas model – predictions for interest rates and levels (though not growth rates) of consumption and capital
differ between the models. Given that incentives for innovation are an important part of the difference between the
two models, I maintain these differences in the quantitative analysis.
37I normalize TFP0 = E0 = L0 = 10. This normalization simply sets the units of the analysis and has no effect
on the quantitative results of the model. I also assume that the economy is on the BGP at time t = 0. Given the
other parameters in the model, this yields Y0 = 93.50, K0 = 8.25, pE,0 = 0.80, AE,0 = 10.15, and AN,0 = 909.03.
38The model abstracts from energy transformation, implying that primary and final-use energy use are the same.
Due to limitations on the price data for final-use energy, the calibration focuses on primary energy.
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5.2 R&D Calibration
The key R&D parameters remaining to be calibrated are the inherent efficiencies of each sector, ηN
and ηE .
39 To calibrate them, it is also necessary to solve for R∗E . To start, I re-write the research
arbitrage equation in terms of observables,
1 + g∗E
1 + g∗N
=
θ∗E
α
ηE
ηN
( R∗E
1−R∗E
)−λ
. (25)
This equation has a natural interpretation. Monopolists must trade off the relative benefits and
costs of investing in the two types of technology. The ratio
θ∗E
α is a summary measure of the relative
return to investment in energy efficiency. The energy expenditure share, θ∗E , captures the benefit
to energy efficiency improvements. Meanwhile, α gives the fraction of increased final output that
will be paid to capital good producers. The remaining terms on the right-hand side capture the
inverse of relative costs – i.e. research efficiencies – of investing in the two types of technology,
which are determined by inherent productivity and the degree of congestion.40 To complete the
R&D calibration, I add the following two equations,
g∗E = ηE(R
∗
E)
1−λ, (26)
g∗N = ηN (1−R∗E)1−λ, (27)
which ensure that rates of technological progress match their values in the data.
Taking the ratio of (26) and (27) and substituting into (25) yields
R∗E
1−R∗E
=
g∗E
1 + g∗E
1 + g∗N
g∗N
θ∗E
α
, (28)
which captures the equilibrium relationship between research allocation and growth rates on the
BGP. As expected, there is a positive relationship between R∗E and both g
∗
E and θ
∗
E . All of the
variables on the right-hand side are observable and imply that 13.3% of research expenditure is
spent improving the energy efficiency of capital goods. This result is independent of the level of
research congestion, λ, and inherent efficiencies, {ηE , ηN}.41 Intuitively, the structure of the model
implies that investment in energy efficiency must be relatively low because both the incentive for
39An alternate approach would be to assume that ηE = ηN and calibrate λ. Such an approach leads to a
significantly higher value of λ (0.69). As shown below, this would greatly magnify the difference between the putty-
clay and Cobb-Douglas approaches.
40Hassler et al. (2016b) identify a similar relationship between equilibrium growth rates and the expenditure share
of energy when considering a social planner solution with a general CES production function and finite set of energy
resources that can be extracted from the environmental without cost. In their framework, the long-run equilibrium
must also conform to the social planner’s optimal depletion of the energy resource. This pins down the long-run
expenditure share and growth rates. Since energy use is currently rising, the data suggests that the BGP conditions
are not met in the Hassler et al. (2016b) world, leading to the prediction that the energy expenditure share will
increase and consumption growth will decrease in the long run.
41Unfortunately, existing data sources do not separate expenditure by different characteristics of the same good,
making it difficult to compare this result to existing evidence.
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R&D in energy efficiency – captured by the ratio of expenditure shares – and the relative growth
rate of energy efficient technology – captured by the remaining two terms – are low.
To solve for the research efficiencies, I first consider the ratio of (26) and (27), which yields
ηE
ηN
=
g∗E
g∗N
(1−R∗E
R∗E
)1−λ
. (29)
Since the growth rate of energy efficient technology is large relative to the research allocation, it
must be the case that the inherent efficiency of this type of research is high. In particular, applying
the results found above yields ηEηN = 2.42.
42 To complete the calibration, I plug R∗E into equation
(27) to find ηN = 0.44 and then use (29) to find ηE = 1.05.
5.3 Energy Sector Calibration
To calibrate the energy sector parameters, I start by noting that, on the BGP, both cumulative and
per period energy use grow at a constant rate, g∗M . The most important parameter for the energy
sector is ι, which captures the rate at which growth in energy use translates into growth in energy
prices,
ι =
ln(1 + g∗E)
ln(1 + g∗M )
. (30)
In the model, environmental policy will decrease energy use, which in turns lowers the price of
energy and the incentive for energy efficient research. The size of this effect depends directly on ι.
In the data, energy efficiency grows significantly faster than energy use, which leads to an estimate
of ι = 2.31.
Next, to ensure that the economy starts in a steady state, it must be the case the total extracted
energy grows at a constant rate. Thus, I calculate the initial level of extracted energy as
E¯−1 = g∗M/E0, (31)
where E¯−1 is the cumulative energy used prior to the first period. Conditional on ι, the ratio
between the initial stock and the per period flow of energy use determines the degree to which
energy prices fluctuate in response to policy-induced changes in energy use. If the stock of consumed
energy is large, then per period energy use fluctuations will only have a small effect on extraction
costs. The calibration yields E¯−1 = 114 with per period energy use normalized to 10. As discussed
in Section 6.2, the calibration implies that the endogenous price of energy plays a significant role
in the quantitative outcomes, but not in the qualitative conclusions from comparing the putty-clay
and Cobb-Douglas models.
42Research efficiency could be greater in energy efficiency for a number of reasons. Appendix Section B.6.1 provides
a simple example where there is a greater diversity of research tasks necessary to improve non-energy technology.
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Table 1: Parameters
Parameter Value Description Source
α .35 Capital share of income Golosov et al. (2014)
δ 1 Depreciation Golosov et al. (2014)
β .860 Discount factor Golosov et al. (2014)
σ 1 Inter-temporal substitution Golosov et al. (2014)
n 0.10 Population growth EIA
λ 0.21 Research congestion Fried (forthcoming)
ηE 1.05 Research efficiency Calibrated
ηN 0.44 Research efficiency Calibrated
ι 2.31 Energy cost growth Calibrated
ξ 1.40 · 10−5 Energy cost scale Calibrated
E¯−1 114 Initial extracted energy Calibrated
Finally, ξ is a scale parameter calibrated to the starting price,
ξ =
pE,0
E¯ι−1
. (32)
Conditional on the other parameters, ξ simply reflects the normalization levels for the other pa-
rameters. Values for all parameters are provided in Table 1.
5.4 Solving the Model
Conditional on the price of energy, the model can separated into three pieces: the R&D allocations,
the standard neoclassical growth model with monopolistic competition, and the energy sector. The
fact that innovation occurs in different characteristics of capital goods, rather than in different
sectors, facilitates the solution of the model. In particular, equations (19) and (20) demonstrate
that, conditional on the price of energy, the R&D allocations and technology growth rates can be
solved independently of the consumer problem. To find the competitive equilibrium, I employ the
following steps:43
1. Guess a vector of energy prices.
2. Solve for productivity paths and R&D allocations using equations (8), (19) and (20), noting
that all monopolists make identical research decisions.
3. Solve the neoclassical growth model conditional on the path of productivities using equations
(B.29) – (B.35) in Appendix Section B.4.1.
4. Back out implied energy use and energy prices using equations (2), (4), and (5). This takes
advantage of the fact that (3) holds with equality in all periods.
43In all quantitative applications, this procedure is sufficient to find a competitive equilibrium. I have not shown
that such a procedure must converge to an equilibrium. In all cases, I use the BGP in the absence of energy taxes to
generate the initial guess of energy prices.
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5. Check if the initial guess and resulting prices are the same. If they are, then consumers have
made optimal decisions taking all future prices as given and the economy is in equilibrium.
6. If the economy is not in equilibrium, start from step 1 with a convex combination of initial
guess and resulting prices.
6 Results
6.1 Long-Run Sustainability
Before using the calibrated model to investigate the impacts of policy, I briefly consider the im-
plications for sustainable economic growth in the putty-clay model with directed technical change.
I consider two different versions of sustainability and, in both cases, find results that are more
optimistic than the existing literature. I first consider the more standard version of sustainabil-
ity, which asks whether consumption growth can continue at current level even as nonrenewable
resources are depleted. The existing DTC literature focuses on the case of exhaustible resources
and suggests that it is not possible to maintain current consumption levels (Andre´ and Smulders,
2014; Hassler et al., 2012, 2016b). Energy use in the United States is currently increasing, which
is not a long-run possibility when all resources are exhaustible. Thus, the models suggest that, in
the long-run, energy use will eventually begin to decrease. Since energy and non-energy inputs are
complements, this also implies that some research effort will be shifted towards energy efficiency,
slowing growth in overall TFP and consumption.
In contrast, I consider the more empirically relevant case where the potential supply of energy
is infinite, but can only be accessed at increasing and unbounded extraction costs. On the balanced
growth path, improvements in energy efficiency fully offset increases in the extraction cost, implying
that there is no need for energy use to decrease in the long run. Indeed, the model suggests that
energy use is necessarily growing in the long run, absent policy intervention. As a result, there is
no reason to expect that consumption growth will decrease in the long run, even as nonrenewable
resources are depleted and the economy is forced to expend more resources for each unit of energy
extracted.
The second notion of sustainability is more closely related to climate change. In particular, it
asks whether policy intervention can prevent an ‘environmental disaster’ (Acemoglu et al., 2012;
Lemoine, 2017). In the context of climate change, an environmental disaster could be a high
degree of warming that causes significant hardship to human beings. Thus, it is natural to think
of energy as the polluting resource in this context. Existing work has focused on the substitution
between clean and dirty sources of energy and found that disasters are inevitable when polluting
and non-polluting are complements (Acemoglu et al., 2012). By contrast, Section 4.5 demonstrates
that environmental disasters can be avoided even in the case of perfect complementarity. This
difference occurs because the model accounts for the fact that energy-augmenting technology is also
energy-saving. In other words, it distinguishes between the polluting resource and the augmenting
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technology, which contributes to output but does not itself pollute.44 Acemoglu et al. (2012),
by contrast, focus on the case where technological advances contribute to the production of the
polluting good. Thus, their formulation captures technologies that aid in the extraction of fossil
fuels, but not in the energy efficiency of capital goods.
6.2 Energy Taxes
In this section, I examine the effect of energy taxes in the putty-clay model of directed technical
change and compare the results to those in the standard Cobb-Douglas model. The time period
in the model is ten years. All future policies are announced in the initial period, which I take as
2005 to match the stated objectives of international climate agreements. All policies take effect
in 2015. The gap between the announcement and implementation of the policy allows one round
of endogenous and directed technical change to occur before comparing the outcomes across the
two models. If the policy were unexpected, the final good producer in the Cobb-Douglas model
could react, whereas there would be no adjustment in the putty-clay model with directed technical
change due to the Leontief structure.
To best understand the quantitative impacts of the new model of energy use developed in this
paper, it is necessary to consider a realistic path of future energy taxes. Under the Paris Agreement
on climate change, the United States aims to adopt policies consistent with a 80% reduction in
carbon emissions by the year 2050, when compared to 2005 levels. I apply taxes such that half
of this gain, a 40% reduction, comes from lower energy use.45 The evidence in Figure 1 suggests
that energy efficiency has been responsible for well more than half of past decreases in the carbon
intensity of output.
As in Section 4.4, I consider a path of proportional energy taxes that grow at a constant rate,
τt = 1 · (1 + gτ )
t−2005
10 . (33)
To achieve the environmental goals given above, the putty-clay model with directed technical
change requires gτ = .36.
46 When taking into account the general equilibrium effect of energy use
on extraction costs, this yields a tax-inclusive energy price that is 273% higher than the laissez-faire
level in 2055.
Figure 3 presents the results. In particular, it demonstrates the paths of energy use, output,
TFP, consumption, and the energy expenditure share from 2005 to 2115.47 All outcomes are given
as a fraction of the business as usual scenario. As expected, energy taxes simultaneously increase
the energy expenditure share and decrease energy use. In other words, capital good producers
44Acemoglu et al. (2012) note that an environmental disaster can be averted when pollution comes only from an
exhaustible resource, and there is not enough of the resource to create a disaster. This is a statement about the
potential for a disaster. As in the majority of their paper, I am concerned with whether policy can prevent a disaster
than would occur under a laissez-faire approach.
45Since the model is solved in ten year periods, I choose taxes such that the 40% reduction occurs by 2055.
46To find the minimum tax necessary to achieve the policy goal, I search with a 1% step size.
47In empirical applications, taxes grow for 500 years and then remain constant.
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Figure 3: This figure demonstrates the effect of energy taxes in the putty-clay model with directed technical change.
Energy taxes are proportional to the price of energy and grow at a constant rate: τt = 1 ·(1+gτ ) t−200510 , with gτ = .36.
This level of taxation achieves a 40% reduction in energy in by 2055, compared to 2005 levels. All taxes are rebated
to consumers in a lump sum fashion. All outcomes in the figure are given as a fraction of the outcomes in the baseline
scenario, which has no energy taxation.
have increased incentive to invest in energy efficiency, but the resulting improvement is insufficient
to fully offset the increase in the price of energy. In this way, it is already apparent that the
results will differ from those in the Cobb-Douglas model. By 2055, the economy experiences a 6.8%
decrease in consumption and 3.5% decrease in TFP relative to the baseline. Energy use plummets
to 11% of baseline by 2115, one century after the policy is initially implemented. At the same time,
consumption decreases by 20%, and TFP is 12.7% lower than in the business as usual scenario.
Figure 4 repeats the analysis for the standard Cobb-Douglas model with exogenous technological
progress. The effect of policy in the Cobb-Douglas approach differs considerably from the putty-
clay model with directed technical change. In this case, gτ = 0.26 is sufficient to achieve a 40%
reduction in energy use by 2055. This leads to a tax-inclusive energy price that is 136% greater
than baseline. To achieve the environmental policy priories, consumption decreases by 2.1% in 2055
and 6.4% by 2115, relative to baseline. By 2115, energy use is 18.4% of baseline levels.
As expected, the energy share of expenditure is essentially unchanged in the Cobb-Douglas
model.48 Thus, energy use decreases by enough to fully offset the increase in energy prices. This
can be seen in how quickly the Cobb-Douglas model responds to new taxes. In 2015, energy use
decreases by almost 25% relative to the baseline, in comparison to a 10% decrease in the putty-clay
model. This occurs even though the tax rate is lower in the Cobb-Douglas model.
48The slight decrease in the energy expenditure share is due to the lump sum tax rebates. The expenditure share
of energy in gross output is constant, but after taxes are implemented, a proportion of energy expenditure is rebated
to consumers.
29
2000 2020 2040 2060 2080 2100 2120
Year
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
R
el
at
iv
e 
to
 B
us
in
es
s 
as
 U
su
al
E
Y
TFP
C
Eshare
Figure 4: This figure demonstrates the effect of energy taxes in the standard Cobb-Douglas model with exogenous
technological progress. Energy taxes are proportional to the price of energy and grow at a constant rate: τt =
1 · (1 + gτ ) t−200510 , with gτ = 0.26. This level of taxation achieves a 40% reduction in energy in by 2055, compared
to 2005 levels. All taxes are rebated to consumers in a lump sum fashion. All outcomes in the figure are given as a
fraction of the outcomes in the baseline scenario, which has zero energy taxation.
Figure 5 provides a direct comparison of energy use and consumption in the two models when
applying the same path of energy taxes, specifically those necessary to achieve environmental policy
goals in the Cobb-Douglas model. Thus, the analysis quantifies the error that would occur if policy
was designed with the Cobb-Douglas model, but the true economy was putty-clay with directed
technical change. Energy use is measured as a fraction of the 2005 level, and consumption is
measured relative to the baseline.49
When applying the requisite taxes from the Cobb-Douglas model to the putty-clay model with
directed technical change, energy use in 2055 declines by 25% when compared to 2005 levels, missing
the environmental target by 15 percentage points. Forgone consumption is roughly twice as large
in the putty-clay model. Despite the stated goals of policy, what matters for overall environmental
conditions is cumulative energy use. The difference in cumulative energy use between the two
models is given by the area between the two energy use curves. Over the course of the century,
cumulative energy use is 24% higher in the putty-clay model with directed technical change. These
results further illuminate the important differences between the two models and demonstrate that
policy designed for the Cobb-Douglas model would yield drastically different outcomes in a world
more closely resembling the putty-clay model with directed technical change.
Figure B.1 in Appendix Section B.7 presents the results from several robustness exercises. As
discussed in Section 5, the research congestion parameter, λ, was set exogenously. So, I consider
several alternate values. Most importantly, in panel (a), I consider the limiting case without con-
49Given the difference in market structure, the baseline level of consumption, but not the growth rate of consump-
tion, differs in the two models.
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Figure 5: This figure demonstrates the difference between the putty-clay model of directed technical change and
the standard Cobb-Douglas model with exogenous technological progress. Energy taxes are proportional to the price
of energy and grow at a constant rate: τt = 1 · (1 + gτ ) t−201510 , with gτ = 0.26. In the Cobb-Douglas model with
exogenous technical change, this level of taxation achieves a 40% reduction in energy use by 2055, compared to 2005
levels. All taxes are rebated to consumers in a lump sum fashion. Energy use is measured as a fraction of 2005
levels. Consumption is measured relative to the baseline, which does not include energy taxes. The baseline level of
consumption differs in the two models.
gestion, i.e., λ = 0. This minimizes the difference between the two models by making research
input reallocation as effective as possible. The quantitative results still differ substantially between
the two models. In particular, cumulative energy use with the putty-clay model is 11% greater by
2115, and the putty-clay model misses the policy goal by 5 percentage points. Panel (b) considers
the case of λ = .105, which splits the difference between the baseline and most conservative es-
timates. Cumulative energy use is 17% greater by 2115 with the putty-clay model, and applying
the Cobb-Douglas tax rates causes the model to miss the policy target by 9.6 percentage points in
2055. Naturally, the differences are magnified with considering greater values of λ. In particular,
cumulative energy use is 32% higher by 2115 and the policy target is missed by 22 percentage
points in the putty-clay model when λ = 0.31, as demonstrated in panel (c).
The model was calibrated to the United States. As noted in Section 4.1.2, the fact that energy
prices are fully endogenous can be motivated in two ways. First, we can think of the U.S. as a closed
economy. Second, we can think of policy being applied to the whole world, with the US making up
a constant fraction of total energy use. To ensure that the assumption of fully endogenous energy
prices is not driving the results, I consider the case where the price of energy is exogenous and
equal to the baseline rate. This captures the scenario where the U.S. is a small open economy
taking unilateral action to lessen energy use. The results are presented in panel (d). In this case,
cumulative energy use is 38% higher in the putty-clay model by 2115 and the policy target is
missed by 26 percentage points. Thus, taking energy prices as fully endogenous is a conservative
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approach that lessens the difference between the putty-clay and Cobb-Douglas models. Moreover,
the Cobb-Douglas model only requires energy taxes to grow at gτ = 0.18 to meet the policy target,
implying that the general equilibrium reaction of energy prices is quantitatively important.
6.3 Research Subsidies
Many policy makers are in favor of policy approaches, such as research subsidies or energy efficiency
mandates, that try to reduce energy use without raising prices (Gillingham et al., 2009; Allcott
and Greenstone, 2012).50 A large academic literature, however, suggests that rebound effects will
undermine the effectiveness of these approaches (Gillingham, 2014; Gillingham et al., 2016). Re-
bound occurs when economic behavior following improvements in energy efficiency lead to increases
in energy use, at least partially undoing the initial reduction. Existing work attempts to indirectly
gauge the effectiveness of such policies by measuring the degree of rebound. Using the putty-clay
model of directed technical change, however, I can address the broader motivating question and
directly analyze the impact of such policies on long-run energy use.
Figure 6 presents the results. Panel (a) considers a single period research subsidy of 73% in
2015. This is analogous to the setting in most of the existing literature, which examines one-off
efficiency improvements. In the short-run, energy use decreases considerably, which is unsurprising
given the low short-run elasticity of substitution between energy and non-energy inputs. Over time,
however, energy use catches back up with the baseline. By the end of the century, energy use is
actually higher than in the business as usual case. This is known as ‘backfire’ in the literature.
Long-run energy use is identical to the laissez-faire case. In the literature, this is known as ‘full
rebound’ (Wei, 2010). Intuitively, full rebound occurs because one-off policy interventions do not
change the long-run incentives of capital good producers. Thus, when energy efficiency increases in
the short-run, the incentive for further investment in energy-saving technology decreases, and the
economy converges back to the original BGP.
In terms of environmental policy goals, this result is more pessimistic than the existing macroe-
conomic literature, which suggests less than full rebound (Gillingham et al., 2016), but does not
consider the potential for contemporary efficiency improvements to alter research incentives.51 At
the same time, the transition path is long. As a result, energy efficiency policies may serve as useful
complements to other policy interventions by delaying fossil energy use.
While the existing literature generally focuses on one-off shocks in order to estimate the degree
of rebound, there is no particular reason why attempts to reduce long-run energy use would be
constrained to temporary interventions. In panel (b), I consider a permanent subsidy of 73% to
energy efficiency research. This subsidy is sufficient to achieve the 40% reduction in energy use
discussed in the previous section.
50In the putty-clay model of directed technical change, all innovation occurs in different characteristics of capital
goods. Thus, research subsidies and efficiency mandates are equivalent. In particular, for any given subsidy, there is
an equivalent energy efficiency mandate that yields the same research allocation.
51Recent work by Lemoine (2016) also suggests a higher potential for backfire by considering the general equilibrium
response of prices to efficiency improvements.
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(b) Permanent Subsidy
Figure 6: The effects of research subsidies on energy use. Panel A demonstrates the effects of a single period
research subsidy of 73%. Panel B demonstrates the effects of a permanent subsidy of 73%. This policy achieves a
40% reduction in energy use by 2055, compared to 2005 levels. E flow refers to per period energy use. E stock refers
to cumulative energy use since 2015, the first year the policy takes effect.
Unlike the case of a single period research subsidy, permanent interventions reduce long-run
energy use relative to a business as usual scenario. As demonstrated theoretically in Section 4.5,
however, R&D subsidies are not sufficient to generate absolute long-run declines in energy use.
Intuitively, the initial reduction in energy use again lowers the incentive for future investments
in energy efficient technology. Since the subsidy is permanent, however, the return to investing in
energy-saving technology is greater than the in the laissez-faire case for any given energy expenditure
share. Thus, the economy converges to a BGP with a lower energy expenditure share, which
translates to a lower level of energy use. Still, the logic of the model implies that, for a fixed
level of taxes and subsidies, the growth rate of energy use is positive and constant in the long run.
Given the need to decrease total carbon emissions in order to avoid dangerous levels of warming,
it appears that taxes, or other policies that increase the effective price of energy, are a necessary
component of mitigation policies.
7 Conclusion
Economic analysis of climate change has benefited substantially from the study of growth models
(e.g., Nordhaus, 1993, 2014). This paper contributes to this ongoing effort by focusing on the de-
mand for energy coming from final good production, a crucial margin for climate change mitigation
policy. In particular, I develop a putty-clay model of directed technical change that can explain
both short- and long-run patterns of energy use in the U.S. By contrast, much of the existing litera-
ture either abstracts from energy use (e.g., Nordhaus, 1993, 2014) or uses a Cobb-Douglas approach
that cannot replicate the same facts (e.g., Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000; Golosov et al., 2014). At the
same time, the existing literature on directed technical change and the environmental focuses on
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substitution between energy sources (e.g., Acemoglu et al., 2012) or on the efficiency of the energy
sector (e.g., Andre´ and Smulders, 2014), rather than the energy efficiency of final good production.
I use the new putty-clay model to conduct three policy exercises. In my primary exercise, I
find that policy conclusions based on the standard Cobb-Douglas likely overestimate policy-induced
reductions in energy use. In a second analysis, I find that innovation-driven rebound effects will
prevent policies like R&D subsidies from generating long-run declines in energy use, highlighting
the need for policies that increase effective prices. Finally, I turn to asking an older environmental
policy question: how does the presence of non-renewable resources affect the potential for sustained
economic growth? By combining energy-saving technical change and increasing extraction costs, I
find results that are more optimistic than the existing literature.
There are several possible extensions that would provide important insights into environmental
policy questions. Adding a third margin of technological investment in clean versus dirty energy
sources would make it possible to gain a more complete understanding of the effect of carbon taxes
on emissions. Combined with a model of the carbon cycle, such an analysis could yield updates to
existing estimates of optimal carbon taxes and the social cost of carbon. It would also allow for the
comparison of second-best policies. For example, it would be interesting to compare subsidies for
renewable energy, which would limit the incentive to improve energy efficiency, and energy taxes,
which provide no incentive to invest in clean energy sources.
Another extension would be to expand the geographic scope. The analyses presented here focus
on a single economy, but there are important implications for a multi-region world. In particular,
existing work with exogenous technological progress suggest that unilateral policy actions among
rich countries will have small impacts on overall carbon emissions (Nordhaus, 2010). In a world with
endogenous technological progress and diffusion or trade, however, unilateral policies would improve
worldwide energy efficiency, leading to greater environmental benefit (Di Maria and Van der Werf,
2008; He´mous, 2016). This magnifies the difference with the standard Cobb-Douglas approach,
where substitution of capital for energy in one country would have no direct impact on other
countries. The positive implications of these international spillovers could potentially outweigh
the more pessimistic conclusions that result from considering the putty-clay model with directed
technical change.
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A Data Appendix
A.1 Figure 1
Primary Energy (Ep). Total energy extracted from the environment (i.e., production) plus net
imports. For renewables used in electricity generation, production is equal to electricity generated.
Measured in kilotonnes of oil equivalent (ktoe). Data available from 1971-2014. Source: ‘IEA
Headline Energy Data’ at http://www.iea.org/statistics/topics/energybalances/.
Final-Use Energy (Ef). Total energy consumption: total primary energy minus losses occur-
ring during transformation and energy industry own use. Measured in ktoe. Data available from
1971-2014. Source: ‘IEA Headline Energy Data’ at http://www.iea.org/statistics/topics/
energybalances/.
Carbon Dioxide Emissions (CO2). Carbon dioxide emissions from fuel combustion. Measured
in megatonnes (Mt). Data available from 1971-2014. Source: ‘IEA Headline Energy Data’ at
http://www.iea.org/statistics/topics/energybalances/.
Real GDP (Y ). Real gross domestic product in 2009 chained dollars. Data available from 1929-
2015. Source: NIPA Table Section 1. Accessed via ‘Table D1: Population, U.S. gross domestic
product, and implicit price deflator, 1949– 2011’ at https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/
annual/.
A.2 Figure 2
Energy Expenditure Share (Eshare). Energy expenditure as a share of GDP (%). Data
available from 1970–2014. Source: ‘Table 1.5: Energy consumption, expenditures, and emissions
indicators estimates, 1949–2011’ at https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/.
Energy Intensity of Output (E/Y ). Total primary energy consumption per real dollar of GDP.
Measured in thousand Btu per chained (2009) dollar. Data available from 1949–2016. Source:
‘Table 1.5: Energy consumption, expenditures, and emissions indicators estimates, 1949–2011’ at
https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/.
Nominal Energy Expenditure. Energy expenditure in millions of nominal dollars. Data avail-
able from 1970–2014. Source: ‘Table 1.5: Energy consumption, expenditures, and emissions indi-
cators estimates, 1949–2011’ at https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/.
Primary Energy Consumption. Total Primary Energy Consumption. Measured in Quadrillion
Btu. Data available from 1949–2016. Source: ‘Table 1.5: Energy consumption, expenditures, and
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emissions indicators estimates, 1949–2011’ at https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/annual/.
GDP Price Deflator. U.S. GDP implicit price deflator with base year 2009. Data available from
1929-2015. Source: NIPA Table Section 1. Accessed via ‘Table D1: Population, U.S. gross do-
mestic product, and implicit price deflator, 1949– 2011’ at https://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/
data/annual/.
Real Energy Price. Average real price of primary energy in 2009 chained dollars. Author‘s
calculations: Nominal Energy Expenditure divided by Primary Energy Consumption divided by
GDP Price Deflator.
A.3 Calibration
See above for details regarding Real GDP, Primary Energy Consumption (from figure 2),
and the Energy Expenditure Share.
Population. Total resident population of the United States. Accessed via ‘Table D1: Population,
U.S. gross domestic product, and implicit price deflator, 1949– 2011’ at https://www.eia.gov/
totalenergy/data/annual/.
Gross Output. Author‘s calculations. Using the structure of the model, gross output is calculated
as: Y/
(
1− Eshare1+Eshare
)
.
Energy Efficiency. Author’s calculations: Gross Output / Primary Energy Consumption.
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B Online Appendix
B.1 Final Good Producer Problem
In this section, I derive the inverse demand functions (13) and (14). Consider the maximization of
(2) subject to (3) with υt(i) as the Lagrange multiplier attached to capital good i,
L =
∫ 1
0
AE,t(i)Et(i)di− wtLt −
∫ 1
0
pX,t(i)Xt(i)di− τtpE,t
∫ 1
0
Et(i)di
−
∫ 1
0
υt(i)
[
AE,t(i)Et(i)−
(
AN,t(i)Xt(i)
)α
L1−αt
]
di. (B.1)
Complementary slackness implies
υt(i)
[
AE,t(i)Et(i)−
(
AN,t(i)Xt(i)
)α
L1−αt
]
= 0 ∀i. (B.2)
I focus on the case where the constraint is always binding. This will necessarily be true in the
empirical exercise, because δ = 1 is a sufficient, but not necessary, condition for the constraint to
bind. The first order conditions with respect to Et(i), Xt(i), and Lt are given by:
υt(i) = 1− τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
, (B.3)
υt(i) =
pX,t(i)
αAαN,t(i)L
1−α
t Xt(i)
α−1 , (B.4)
υt(i) =
wt
(1− α)AαN,t(i)L−αt Xt(i)α
. (B.5)
Substituting (B.4) and (B.5) into (B.3), respectively, and multiplying through yields
pX,t(i) = αAN,t(i)
α
[
1− τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
]
L1−αt Xt(i)
α−1, (B.6)
wt = (1− α)
[
1− τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
]
L−αt
(
AN,t(i)Xt(i)
)α
. (B.7)
Thus, we have arrived at equations (13) and (14) from the text. A key result is that inverse demand
is iso-elastic, which allows for simple closed form solutions. This is shown in the next section.
B.2 Monopolist Problem
The monopolist maximizes profits subject to demand and research productivity constraints:
max piX,t(i) = pX,t(i)Xt(i)− rtX(i)− (1− ηSt )pRE,tRE(i)− pRN,tRN (i) (B.8)
(B.9)
subject to
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pX,t(i) = αAN,t(i)
α
[
1− τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
]
L1−αt Xt(i)
α−1, (B.10)
AJ,t(i) =
[
1 + ηJRJ,t(i)R
−λ
J,t
]
AJ,t−1, J ∈ {N,E}, (B.11)
RJ,t(i) ∈ [0, 1], J ∈ {N,E}. (B.12)
In equilibrium, the research allocation must be interior due to the congestion effects. Thus, I ignore
the last constraint for the remainder of this section. First, substitute (B.10) into (B.8) and take
the first order condition with respect to X(i). Constraint (B.11) is independent of the production
level, Xt(i). Hence, the model yields the standard first order conditions and results, adjusted for
the effective cost of energy:
rt = α
2AN,t(i)
α
[
1− τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
]
L1−αt Xt(i)
α−1, (B.13)
Xt(i) = α
2
1−α r
−1
1−αAN,t(i)
α
1−αLt
[
1− τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
] 1
1−α , (B.14)
pX,t(i) =
1
α
rt. (B.15)
Next, to find optimal profits, we can re-write the monopolist problem after substituting in results
we have found so far:
max piX,t(i) = α˜r
−α
1−α
t AN,t(i)
α
1−αLt
[
1 − τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
] 1
1−α − (1 − ηSt )pRE,tRE,t(i) − pRN,tRN,t(i) (B.16)
subject to
AJ,t(i) =
[
1 + ηJRJ,t(i)R
−λ
J,t
]
AJ,t−1, J ∈ {N,E}, (B.17)
where α˜ = ( 1α − 1)α
2
1−α . Let κJ be the Lagrange multiplier for constraint (B.17). The first order
conditions for technology levels and research scientist allocations yield
pRN,t = κNAN,t−1R
−λ
N,t, (B.18)
(1− ηSt )pRE,t = κEAE,t−1R−λE,t, (B.19)
κN =
α
1− αα˜r
−α
1−α
t AN,t(i)
α
1−α−1Lt
[
1− τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
] 1
1−α , (B.20)
κE =
1
1− αα˜r
−α
1−α
t AN,t(i)
α
1−αLt
[
1− τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
] 1
1−α−1τtpE,tA−2E,t. (B.21)
Putting these together, we have
pRN,t = αψtA
α
1−α−1
N,t
[
1− τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
] 1
1−α ηNR
−λ
N,tAN,t−1, (B.22)
(1− ηSt )pRE,t = ψtA
α
1−α
N,t τtpE,tAE,t(i)
−2[1− τtpE,t
AE,t(i)
] 1
1−α−1ηER−λE,tAE,t−1, (B.23)
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where ψt =
α˜
1−αr
−α
1−α
t Lt is common to both terms. In the next section, I shown the optimal research
allocations resulting from these first order conditions. Taking ratios of these first order conditions
yields (18) in the main text.
B.3 R&D Allocations
In this section, I derive the optimal research allocations given in equations (19) and (20). First,
note that RJ,t(i) = RJ,t ∀i, t, J . This occurs because all monopolists make identical decisions, and
there are a unit mass of monopolists. This also implies that AJ,t(i) = AJ,t ∀i, t, J . Also, factor
mobility ensures that pRE,t = p
R
N,t ∀t. Thus, equation (18) can then be re-written as
(1− ηSt )
AE,t
AE,t−1
[ AE,t
τtpE,t
− 1] = AN,t
AN,t−1
ηER
−λ
E
αηNR
−λ
N
. (B.24)
Replacing growth rates and technology levels with the values given by (8) and applying the resource
constraint (9) yields
(1− ηSt )(1 + ηER1−λE,t )
[(1 + ηER1−λE,t )AE,t−1
τtpE,t
− 1] = (1 + ηN (1−RE,t)1−λ) ηER−λE,t
αηN (1−RE,t)−λ(B.25)
Dividing by (1 − ηSt ), then multiplying through on the left-hand side and isolating the term with
energy prices yields
(1 + ηER
1−λ
E )
2AE,t−1
τtpE,t
=
1
1− ηSt
[ ηER−λE
αηN (1−RE)−λ
(
1 + ηN (1−RE)1−λ
)]
+ (1 + ηER
1−λ
E ). (B.26)
Distributing terms on the right-hand side leaves
(1 + ηER
1−λ
E )
2AE,t−1
τtpE,t
=
1
α(1− ηSt )
[ ηER−λE
ηN (1−RE)−λ + ηER
−λ
E − ηER1−λE,t
]
+ (1 + ηER
1−λ
E ). (B.27)
Now, (19) can be derived by multiplying through by
τtpE,t
AE,t−1 , taking the square root of both sides,
subtracting one, and dividing by ηER
−λ
E .
B.4 Solving the Model
B.4.1 Intensive Form
In this section, I show how to solve the model in intensive form. This is helpful both for the
quantitative exercise (see Section 5.4) and in proving the propositions in Sections 4.4 and 4.5. For
any variable Zt, I define
zt ≡ Zt
LtAR,t
, (B.28)
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where AR,t = TFP
1
1−α
t and TFPt = A
α
N,t
[
1− pE,tAE,t
]
. Applying (6), (7), and (10), this yields
yt = k
α
t , (B.29)
kt+1 =
yt − ct
(1 + gr,t+1)(1 + n)
, (B.30)
where 1 + gr,t =
AR,t
AR,t−1 = (1 + gTFP,t)
1
1−α . Moreover, the Euler equation yields
(ct+1
ct
)σ
=
βrt+1
(1 + gr,t+1)σ
. (B.31)
Finally, when considering the interest rate, it is also important to keep track of the energy tax
rate, τt. Let A˜R,t = A
α
N,t
[
1− τtpE,tAE,t
]
be TFP adjusted for energy taxes. Then, from equation (16),
rt = α
2AαN,t
[
1− τtpE,t
AE,t
]
Kα−1t L
1−α
t (B.32)
= α2
( Kt
A˜R,tLt
)α−1
(B.33)
= α2
(AR,t
A˜R,t
)α−1( Kt
AR,tLt
)α−1
(B.34)
= τ˜tα
2kα−1t , (B.35)
where τ˜t ≡
(AR,t
A˜R,t
)α−1
=
1− τtpE,t
AE,t
1− pE,t
AE,t
is the interest rate wedge caused by the introduction of energy
taxes.
When solving the model, I guess on a path of energy prices and then solve for the research
allocations and growth rates. Then, the solution to the remainder of the model is given by (B.29),
(B.30), (B.31), and (B.35). As described above, this is just the standard neoclassical growth
model with a few additions. The α2 term in (B.35) is the standard adjustment for monopolistic
competition, τ˜t is the wedge in the interest rate caused by carbon taxes, and gR,t may not be
constant due to endogenous research allocations and energy prices.
B.4.2 Proof to Propositions 1, 2, and 4.
Proof to items 3 – 5 of Propositions 2 and 4. To find the BGP, first note that τ˜t = τ¯ , a
constant. In the laissez-faire case, τ¯ = 1. In the case of environmental policy (EP), τ¯ =
[
1− τtpE,tAE,t
]
,
which is also constant. In the EP case, the economy does not converge to the BGP in finite time.
As discussed in the main text, gTFP = (1 + g
∗
N )
α − 1 on the BGP because [1− pE,tAE,t ] is fixed (at 1
in the case of EP). Thus, the growth rate of output per person is given by g∗R = (1 + g
∗
N )
α
1−α − 1.
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With constant growth rates of technology, the BGP is given by:
r¯ =
(1 + g∗R)
σ
β
, (B.36)
k¯ =
( τ¯α2
r¯
) 1
1−α , (B.37)
y¯ = k¯α, (B.38)
c¯ = y¯ − (1 + g∗R)(1 + n)k¯, (B.39)
where z¯ denotes the steady state value of z. Thus, rt is constant, Yt/Lt and Ct/Lt grow at rate g
∗
R,
and Yt and Kt grow at rate g
∗
Y = (1 + g
∗
R)(1 + n)− 1. This proves parts (3) – (5) of Propositions 2
and 4.
Proposition 1 and Item 6 of Propositions 2 and 4. On the BGP, both per period and
cumulative energy use grow at the same, weakly positive rate. At any point in time, energy use is
given by
Et =
AαN,t
AE,t
Kαt L
1−α
t . (B.40)
On the BGP, therefore, the growth rate of energy is given by
g∗M =
(1 + g∗N )
α
1−α
(1 + g∗E)
(1 + n)− 1. (B.41)
This proves item (6) of the propositions, except for the sign restrictions. Research allocations
must be interior due to the congestion effects. This implies that τtpE,t is growing on the BGP.
In a laissez-faire equilibrium, this implies that pE,t is growing and, as a result, that the growth
rate of energy use is positive. In the EP case, if gτ is sufficiently high, then a BGP requires
1 + g∗E > (1 + g
∗
N )
α
1−α (1 +n) (see item (1)). If the per period growth rate of energy use is negative,
then the cumulative growth rate and the growth rate of the price of energy both converge to zero
in the limit. In this case, energy efficiency grows at rate gτ on the BGP.
Items 1 and 2 of Propositions 2 and 4. On a BGP, energy efficiency grows at the rate of the
energy price times the growth in energy taxes. Writing the price of energy is terms of energy use,
(1 + g∗M )
ι(1 + gτ ) = (1 + g
∗
E). (B.42)
Combining these last two equations yields
(1 + g∗E)
1+1/ι(1 + gτ )
−1/ι = (1 + g∗N )
α
1−α (1 + n). (B.43)
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The existence of an interior solution is guaranteed by assumption (A.1). Applying (8) and (9) to
this equation yields item (2) of Propositions 2 and 4. Rearranging yields item (1).
Item 7 of Propositions 2 and 4. All that remains to show for these two propositions is that
expenditure shares are constant. To start, from equation (14) note that
wtLt = (1− α)AαN,t[1−
τtpE,t
AE,t
]KαL1−α = τ˜t(1− α)Yt, (B.44)
which is constant on the BGP. Next, from (22) and (16),
rtKt = α
2AαN,t[1−
τtpE,t
AE,t
]KαL1−α = τ˜tα2Yt, (B.45)
which is again constant on the BGP. The remaining share, (1−α−α2)Yt, is the production profits
of the monopolists. This can be further divided into pure profits and payments to research inputs.
All research inputs are hired at the same rate. By equation (B.22), total payments to research
inputs is given by
pRt =
α
1− α(
1
α
− 1)rtXt
AN,t
ηNR
−λ
N AN,t−1 (B.46)
=
α
1− α(
1
α
− 1) · ηN (RN )
−λ
1 + gN
· τtα2Yt, (B.47)
noting that there is a unit mass of research inputs. This is again constant on the BGP. The
remaining share of final output is paid to monopolists as pure profits.
To get the energy expenditure share in either case, rearrange equation (19) to isolate
τtpE,t
AE,t−1 =
τtpE,t(1+g
∗
E)
AE,t
, which is constant. In the laissez-faire case, τt = 1 and
pE,t
AE,t
=
θ∗E
1+θ∗E
. In the EP case,
limt→∞
pE,t
AE,t
= 0 ⇒ limt→∞ θE,t − τtpE,tAE,t = 0. Thus, item (7) of the propositions is proven.
B.5 The Cobb-Douglas Model
In this section, I derive the dynamics, BGP, and calibration procedure for the Cobb-Douglas model.
To start, I note that, due to perfect competition, aggregate energy use is given by
Et =
( ν
τtpE,t
) 1
1−ν (ACDt )
1
1−νK
γ
1−ν
t L
1−γ−ν
1−ν
t . (B.48)
This, in turn, yields
Qt =
( ν
pE,t · τt
) ν
1−ν (ACDt )
1
1−νK
γ
1−ν
t L
(1−γ−ν)
1−ν
t , (B.49)
Yt =
(
1− ν
τ
)
Qt. (B.50)
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To analyze the model in intensive form, I define
zt =
Zt
Lt(ACDt )
1
1−γ−ν (τt · pE,t)
−ν
1−γ−ν
, (B.51)
for any variable Zt. This notation is specific to Appendix Section B.5.
The Euler equation is the same as in the putty-clay case. In intensive form,
ct+1
ct
=
βrt+1
(1 + gCD)
1
1−γ−ν (1 + g˜P,t+1)
−ν
1−γ−ν
, (B.52)
where 1 + g˜P,t+1 = (1 + gτ,t+1)(1 + gP,t+1), 1 + gτ,t =
τt
τt−1 , and I have imposed σ = 1. The rest of
the dynamics are given by
kt+1 =
yt − ct
(1 + gCD,t+1)
1
1−γ−ν (1 + g˜P,t+1)
−ν
1−γ−ν (1 + n)
, (B.53)
yt = (1− ν
τ
)ν
ν
1−ν k
γ
1−ν
t , (B.54)
rt = γk
γ−(1−ν)
1−ν
t . (B.55)
As in the case of the putty-clay model, I solve the model by first guessing a path of energy taxes
and then solving the growth model with equations (B.52) – (B.55).
I consider the BGP in a laissez-faire equilibrium. This gives
r¯ =
(1 + g∗CD)
1
1−γ−ν (1 + g∗P )
−ν
1−γ−ν
β
, (B.56)
k¯ = (r¯/γ)
1−ν
γ−(1−ν) , (B.57)
y¯ = (1− ν)ν ν1−ν k¯ γ1−ν , (B.58)
c¯ = y¯ − (1 + g∗CD)
1
1−γ−ν (1 + g∗P )
−ν
1−γ−ν (1 + n)k¯. (B.59)
As a result, rt is constant, Yt/Lt and Ct/Lt grow at rate (g
∗
R)
CD = (1+g∗CD)
1
1−γ−ν (1+g∗P )
−ν
1−γ−ν −1,
and Yt and Kt grow at rate g
CD
Y = (1 + g
∗
R)
CD(1 + n)− 1.
I calibrate the model to the BGP using the same data as employed for the putty-clay model,
leading to observationally equivalent paths for output and energy use. To match the energy expen-
diture share, I set
ν
1− ν = θ
∗
E (B.60)
and
γ = α− ν. (B.61)
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All that remains is to ensure that total output grows at the same rate in the two models, which
implies that energy use will also grow at the same rate. Since the energy sector is equivalent in the
two models, this further implies that the price of energy will grow at the same rate. Thus, I set
(g∗R)
CD = g∗R, where the later comes from the putty-clay model in Section B.4.1. This implies that
g∗R = (1 + g
∗
CD)
1
1−γ−ν (1 + g∗P )
−ν
1−γ−ν − 1 ⇒ (B.62)
g∗CD = (1 + g
∗
R)
1−γ−ν(1 + g∗E)
ν − 1. (B.63)
The calibration yields g∗CD = .42, which corresponds to an annual growth rate of 3.5%. The growth
rate of TFP is higher in the Cobb-Douglas case because it needs to overcome the drag of rising
energy prices to achieve the same BGP rates of growth in consumption and output.
B.6 Alternate Formulations
B.6.1 R&D Production Function
In this section, I discuss an equivalent formulation for the R&D production function, equation (8),
that illustrates why the time-invariant component of research productivity might differ between
sectors. I consider the case where R&D to improve aggregate technology AJ requires progress on a
set of distinct steps or processes. This approach is closely related to the notion of sector diversity
in Fried (forthcoming). The number of processes, ρJ , is fixed over time, and R&D inputs are
distributed equally across processes. Now, the R&D production function is given by
AJ,t =
[
1 + ω
(RJ,t(i)
ρJ
)(RJ,t
ρJ
)−λ]
AJ,t−1, (B.64)
where ω is the inherent efficiency of research, which is common to both sectors. The term
(RJ,t(i)
ρJ
)
captures each firm’s effective investment in research of type J . The rate of technological progress
depends on the number of research inputs devoted to each process. The degree of congestion is
given by
(RJ,t
ρJ
)−λ
, which increases with economy-wide investment and decreases in the number
of processes. Setting ηJ = ωρ
λ−1
J yields the specification in the main text. The calibration gives
ηE > ηN , implying that there is greater diversity in non-energy research.
B.6.2 Final Good Production
In this section, I consider an equivalent formulation for the aggregate production function, equation
(2), that further highlights the continuity with the existing DTC literature. Consider the following
equations,
Yt = L
1−α
t
∫ 1
0
(
AN,t(i)Xt(i)
)αEt(i)
Rt(i)
di (B.65)
s.t. E(i) ≤ R(i), (B.66)
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where Lt is the aggregate (and inelastic) labor supply, AN,t(i) is the the quality of capital good i,
Xt(i) is the quantity of capital good i, Rt(i) is the amount of energy required to run capital good
i at full capacity, and Et(i) is the amount of actual energy used to run capital good i.
It is easiest to start by comparing this equation to the standard production function used in DTC
models (and, more generally, in many endogenous growth models): Yt = L
1−α
t
∫ 1
0
(
AN,t(i)Xt(i)
)α
di.
Here, final production is the combination of a set of processes, each of which combines aggregate
labor, Lt, with a specific capital good, Xt(i). The effectiveness of each process is determined by
the quality of the capital good, AN,t(i). Each of these processes is perfectly substitutable with
the others, though each is used in equilibrium because of diminishing returns to capital. To this
standard approach, I add energy requirements. In particular, I assume that each piece of capital
requires a specific amount of energy, Rt(i), to run at full capacity. If the amount of energy, Et(i),
devoted to process i is less than Rt(i), then the final goods producer receives less than the full
benefit of that process. In particular, if the final good producer allocates, say, 80% of the required
energy, i.e. Et(i)/Rt(i) = .8, then it receives 80% of full capacity output.
To actually work with the model, it is necessary to assign a functional form to the energy
requirement function, R(i). Consider the following specification:
Rt(i) = L
1−α
t
(
AN,t(i)Xt(i)
)α 1
AE,t(i)
, (B.67)
where AE,t(i) is a measure of energy efficiency. There are several key things to note about this
function. First, consistent with the econometric literature on energy use, energy requirements
depend both on the amount of capital and the amount of labor being used in the production
process (Van der Werf, 2008; Hassler et al., 2012). Second, consistent with both the econometric
and DTC literatures, improvements in non-energy technology, AN,t(i), raise energy requirements
(Smulders and De Nooij, 2003; Van der Werf, 2008; Hassler et al., 2012, 2016b; Fried, forthcoming).
Replacing (B.67) into (B.65) and (B.66) demonstrates that this set-up is identical to (2) and (3).
B.7 Robustness Exercises
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(b) λ = .105.
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(d) Exogenous pE,t.
Figure B.1: Robustness exercises. Panels (a) - (c) consider alternate values of research congestion, λ. In each case,
gτ = 0.27, which is the tax rate requires to achieve policy goals with the Cobb-Douglas model. Panel (d) presents
the results when energy prices grow exogenously at rate, gP = 0.21. This matches the growth rate of energy prices
on the BGP in the baseline scenarios. The tax rate is given by gτ = 0.18, which is the tax rate requires to achieve
policy goals with the Cobb-Douglas model.
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